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ABSTRACT  
Campaign-finance reformers have turned in recent years to a novel form of publicly-financed elections—small-
donor matching programs—as the way to reduce the perceived corruption that arises from the current role of money 
in American elections.  The rise of the Internet and social media have transformed the way campaigns are funded 
and turned small donors into a major force in American campaigns.  The 2018 elections dramatically 
demonstrated the new power of small donors.  Building on this transformation, the focus of reform efforts are now 
programs that match small donations ($200 or less) with public funds, which typically provide $6 in public 
funds for every $1 in small donations.  Indeed, the first bill introduced in the new Democratically controlled House 
proposes to create a 6:1 small-dollar matching program for national elections.  In addition, the Democratic Party 
required candidates for the 2020 presidential election to demonstrate a certain level of success with small donors 
as one of only two factors that determined eligibility to be on the “main debate” stage for the first several debates. 
Small-donor based public financing is touted as enhancing participation in democracy; improving the equality of 
campaign financing; and providing a countervailing force against the role of large donors or special-interest money.  
But little attention has been paid so far, particularly in the legal literature, to the effect of small donors on what 
is one of the most troubling aspects of American democracy today:  the intense polarization of the political parties.  
In fact, an extensive empirical literature demonstrates that small donors tend to prefer candidates from the 
ideological extremes of the major parties.  Thus, while small-donor matching programs serve certain democratic 
values, they might also contribute to making American democracy more polarized and more dysfunctional. 
The issue of small-donor financing represents a larger point about the problematic direction of much political 
reform over the last several decades.  This “reform populism” seeks to address problems in democracy through 
changes that encourage more direct, unmediated participation by citizens in the political process.  But the more 
engaged citizens are in politics, the more polarized they are.  Paradoxically, participation fuels polarization.  
Rather than jumping on the bandwagon of reforms celebrated in the name of enhanced participation, equality, and 
anti-corruption, we should be careful to avoid designing political processes in ways that only further fuel the 
hyperpolarization of American democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Campaign-finance controversies and reform advocacy in recent decades 
have focused primarily on the issues of “corruption” and “equality”:  whether 
large contributions or spending corrupt the decisions of public officials and 
whether the fact that those with more resources are able to contribute or 
spend much more than those without such resources is a troubling distortion 
of the democratic process.  But one of the greatest threats to American 
democracy over recent decades has been the rise of hyperpolarized politics 
and political parties; in the American separated-powers system, 
hyperpolarized political parties make it all the more difficult for the national 
political process to address the major issues of the day.1  When government 
appears to be paralyzed, unresponsive, and dysfunctional, this in turn 
furthers political alienation, distrust of government, and even contempt for 
democracy itself.   
In this light, it is thus surprising how little attention scholars, 
commentators, and reform advocates have paid to exploring whether the 
structure of American campaign-finance law contributes to the 
hyperpolarization of the political parties and our politics that characterize 
this era.  With reform advocates fixated on the issues of corruption and 
equality, this Article argues that we also need to assess the campaign-finance 
system we have, along with potential reforms to it, in terms of whether 
specific ways of structuring campaign finance tend to further fuel or diminish 
polarization.2    
To put these issues in a broad context:  American elections (unlike those 
in most democracies) are privately financed, which turns out to mean they 
are mainly financed from the credit cards, checkbooks, and bank accounts of 
individual donors.  In the 2015–2016 presidential election cycle, 71% of the 
money candidates raised for the primaries and general election came from 
 
 1 See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold:  The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 
99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 277 (2011). 
 2 One of the only sources in the legal literature to do so is Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign 
Finance Law, in DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE:  REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 74 
(Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018).  Stephanopoulos begins by recognizing that 
individual donors come from the ideological poles of the party.  But when he briefly discusses 
public-financing options at the end, he does not address whether national small-donor matching 
programs will reflect this same dynamic or even further fuel it, and he does not engage the empirical 
literature suggesting that small donors are just as much or even more prone to reflect the ideological 
poles of the parties and the electorate. 
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individual donors.3  For House and Senate candidates in that same cycle, 
about 59% of money raised came from individual donors.4  One of the most 
robust findings in the empirical campaign-finance literature is that individual 
donors are the most ideological and polarizing sources of money flowing to 
campaigns (other contributors include political parties, political-action 
committees (PACs), and candidates themselves).  That finding is consistent 
with the more general finding that the more individuals choose to be actively 
engaged in politics, through various forms of political activity, the more 
polarized they are.5  Those who participate most actively, that is, tend to 
come further from the poles of each party than ordinary citizens or voters.  
Donating money is a much higher level of engagement than merely voting.    
This larger structure is important to bear in mind in considering different 
directions for campaign-finance reform.  In particular, recent years have 
spawned a celebration of the rise of “small donors” in the money landscape.  
As a result of the communications revolution, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the number of people providing small donations6 to candidates, 
as well as the total amount of money campaigns now raise from small donors.  
Building on this transformation, the dominant thrust of reform advocacy has 
turned to arguing that reforms should be organized around the role of small 
donors.  Whether through the adoption of voucher-systems of campaign 
financing or through efforts to extend local government small-donor 
 
 3 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, PRESIDENTIAL PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGN RECEIPTS THROUGH 
DECEMBER 31, 2016 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/presid
ential/PresCand1_2016_24m.pdf.  The total all candidates raised was a bit over $1.5 billion, with 
$1.1 billion coming from individual donors.  
 4 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, HOUSE AND SENATE FINANCIAL ACTIVITY FROM JANUARY 1, 2015 
THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables
/congressional/ConCand1_2016_24m.pdf.  This Article focuses on contributions to campaigns, 
not on independent spending.  Campaigns generally value direct contributions more highly than 
independent spending on their behalf, partly because campaigns have complete control over how 
to use resources in their own hands, and partly because campaigns benefit from the requirement 
that broadcasters charge them the lowest available rate when they run campaign ads; independent 
spending by non-campaign entities, such as Super PACs, must pay the full market rate instead.  
 5 See ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER:  ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 61 (2010) (“The American public appears to be increasingly divided 
into two groups:  the politically engaged, who view politics in ideological terms, and the politically 
disengaged, who do not.”). 
 6 In the federal system, donations under $200 do not require disclosure of identifying information 
about the individual donor, and this Article generally defines small donors as those giving under 
$200.  See 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4)(i) (2019) (requiring reporting of contributions in excess of $200).  
Where other definitions are used, based on the way the relevant literature or non-national 
jurisdictions define small donors, those other figures will be provided. 
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“matching” programs to larger jurisdictions, reform advocates have turned 
much of their energy toward organizing election-financing reform around 
the role of small donors.  These are forms of public financing, but they 
abandon more traditional forms of public financing for novel ones built on 
the foundation of small donors. 
But small donors remain individual donors.  In recent years, extensive 
empirical work has emerged that focuses on small donors.  This work suggests 
that, at the least, small donors are just as ideological and oriented toward the 
political extremes of the spectrum as other individual donors.  Moreover, 
some of this literature suggests that small donors might be more polarizing and 
ideologically extreme than other donors.  To be sure, technological 
developments and the role of small-donor financing are changing so rapidly 
right now that any assessment of the nature of small donors to national, state, 
and local campaigns can only be tentative and provisional.  The 2018 
midterms saw an explosion in voter turnout as well as small donations, as 
discussed below; once we can fully assess the pattern of small donations in 
2018, and whether it differs from the past, only future elections will be able 
to tell whether these patterns reflect the exceptional and historic nature of 
the 2018 midterms or a “new normal” in the flow of small dollars.       
Nonetheless, the aim of this article is to bring to light questions about 
both individual donors in general and small donors in particular that have 
become timely.  A cautionary note is needed about the unbridled enthusiasm 
for abandoning traditional public financing options and embracing small-
donor campaign finance reform.  Those who celebrate the benefits of small 
donors for political participation, or for reducing the risks of corruption, need 
to confront more seriously the question of whether such financing will further 
contribute to political polarization.   
We cannot, of course, undo technological changes that enable such 
financing.  But the current flush of enthusiasm for re-organizing the system 
around small-donor financing risks crowding out other approaches to 
reforming campaign financing.  In particular, traditional forms of public 
financing, such as used in a number of states7 and long in use in most 
European democracies,8 continue to deserve attention; they provide many of 
 
 7 For a good recent summary of the states and localities that use various forms of public financing, 
see generally Michael J. Malbin, Citizen Funding for Elections, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (2015), 
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_CitizenFundingforElections.pdf. 
 8 See Oscar Sanchez Munoz, Political Finance and Political Equality:  Lessons from Europe, in DEMOCRACY 
BY THE PEOPLE:  REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 450 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy 
K. Kuhner eds., 2018). 
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the benefits of small-donor financing without contributing to political 
polarization.  
One last opening point, to frame what follows:  the issue of small-donor 
financing is of interest not just in its own right, but for what it represents more 
broadly about the rise and celebration among reformers in recent decades of 
more direct, less mediated forms of democratic participation.  Such financing 
is but one example of “the ascendancy of reform populism”9 since the 1970s, 
which rests on the belief that the way to fix many problems with American 
representative government is “by creating more opportunities for citizens to 
observe, participate in, and control their government’s actions.”10  These 
reform efforts romantically presume that most citizens will rush to take 
advantage of the opportunities for greater political participation and 
therefore fail to recognize that the subset of citizens who will in fact do so will 
likely be as polarized as those who are already more actively engaged in 
politics.  I have written critically in recent years about the costs to American 
democracy of this single-dimensional focus on increasing unmediated, direct 
citizen participation.11  The issue of small-donor financing thus opens a 
window into the more general issue of whether reforms pursued in the name 
of enhanced direct participation will have the unintended consequence of 
further polarizing American democracy. 
I.  THE RISE AND CELEBRATION OF SMALL-DONOR FINANCING  
The communications and social-media revolution is transforming 
democracies around the world, for better and worse.  Initial days of 
unqualified and naïve technological optimism have given way to more sober 
anxieties about the ways unmediated direct political communication, 
through social media and the Internet, can inflame and polarize political 
debate, accelerate the spread of dangerously inaccurate rumors, or enable 
anonymous political actors with various agendas to spread intentionally false 
and misleading “information.”  We now worry about whether democracy 
 
 9 BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS:  AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY 1 
(2015) (title capitalization removed). 
 10 Id. at 7. 
 11 Stephen Gardbaum & Richard H. Pildes, Populism and Institutional Design:  Methods of Selecting 
Candidates for Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 708 (2018). 
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can survive the Internet,12 rather than celebrating how the communications 
revolution will usher in a golden age of democratic engagement.    
Among the aspects of democratic politics being transformed by the 
communications revolution is the system of campaign fundraising.  But here 
the views have been always universally enthusiastic, or at least not critical, 
about the way these changes might affect American democracy.  Indeed, 
many see this Internet-driven transformation of fundraising as heralding the 
salvation of American democracy.  By reducing the transactions costs of 
communication and fundraising, the Internet has enabled the rise of the 
“small donor” in the campaign finance system.  Because First Amendment 
constraints prohibit imposing ceilings on campaign spending, the rise of 
small-donor contributions promises to generate a more egalitarian and 
broadly participatory system of financing.  In addition, small donors serve as 
a countervailing force against what critics see as the corrupting force of 
special interests or “big donors” in elections.  Perhaps the emerging role of 
small donors will also change the mix of candidates who choose to run and 
are likely to succeed.  Even those not troubled by the role that money 
currently plays in American elections seem to have no reason to object to the 
emergence of small donors as a more significant source of campaign 
contributions.   
With the emergence of small-donor contributions on a much larger scale 
in recent elections, many reform efforts are now also designed to piggyback 
on these developments or to reflect the same spirit behind the celebration of 
small-donor financing.  Currently, the most touted of these reforms is a small-
donor matching program, in which public funds are provided at a certain 
ratio to match small-donor contributions up to a certain amount.  So far, 
these programs only exist in a few local governments—the most established 
of which is New York City’s, which since 2009 has provided $6 of public 
funds for every dollar of the first $175 in qualified contributions from city 
residents (a successful ballot measure this fall will now raise that match to 
 
 12 See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63 (2017); see also 
Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before it Breaks Democracy?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 10, 
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerberg-fix-facebook-
before-it-breaks-democracy.  
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8:1).13  Yet with this limited experience to draw on,14 Democrats in Congress 
are now focusing their campaign-finance approach around nationalizing this 
program.  Thus, the political reform bill introduced as the Democrats’ 
signature issue in the new Congress would provide for congressional and 
presidential elections a 6:1 match for donations up to $200.15  The other 
vehicle that is attracting a lot of attention is reform through voucher 
programs, which some academics have touted for years, but was only 
recently adopted for the first time anywhere (with a lot of national money 
behind the effort) in Seattle.16   
These reforms, grounded on a vision that small donors are an ideal source 
of “good” campaign-finance money, have displaced efforts and enthusiasm 
about the more traditional forms of public financing.  These more traditional 
forms, commonly known as “clean elections” or “clean money” programs, 
entail full government funding.  In these programs, candidates qualify for a 
lump-sum grant, once they receive a threshold number of small contributions 
(because these are low thresholds, they presumably do not raise the same 
risks of fueling polarization as financing programs built entirely on small 
donations, as is the case in matching-fund programs).  These grants are 
meant to finance the full costs of a credible campaign; candidates agree to 
accept a spending limit in return for a grant that is equal to that limit.  States 
that use such programs for some of their state or local elections include 
Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, New Mexico, and Vermont.17  Thus, there is 
considerably more experience, particularly at the statewide level, with more 
traditional public financing.   
Nonetheless, as evidenced by the direction national Democrats have 
taken campaign-finance policy in Congress, the reform energy is now nearly 
all directed toward reform built on a foundation of small donors.  Yet for all 
 
 13 See generally How it Works, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/program/how-it-
works (last visited Jan. 10, 2020); What’s New in the Campaign Finance Program, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. 
BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/program/what-s-new-in-the-campaign-finance-program-2/ (last 
visited Jan. 10 2020) (explaining change from six-to-one to eight-to-one matching system). 
 14 See Michael J. Malbin, Citizen Funding for Elections, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (2015), 
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_CitizenFundingforElections.pdf. 
 15 For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 5111 (2019).  For a critical analysis of this bill, 
see Richard H. Pildes, Small Donor Based Campaign-Finance Reform, 129 YALE L.J. ONLINE SYMPOSIUM 
149 (2019). 
 16 Democracy Voucher Program, CITY OF SEATTLE, https://www.seattle.gov/democracyvoucher/about-
the-program (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
 17 See Michael J. Malbin, Citizen Funding for Elections, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. 6 (2015), 
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_CitizenFundingforElections.pdf. 
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the benefits such programs might have along some democratic dimensions, 
strong reasons for concern exist that such programs would add further fuel 
to the fire of hyperpolarization that has scorched American politics in recent 
decades.     
A.  Small Donors as the Salvation of American Democracy  
In the world of election law and American democracy, it is hard to 
identify many political “reforms” as unequivocally and broadly celebrated as 
the emergence of the possibilities for small-donor-financed elections.  
Although Democrats at the moment are feasting more heartily at the small-
donor banquet than Republicans, this has not led Republicans to criticize 
small-donor financing but to try to figure out how to catch up.18  Indeed, 
enthusiasm for small-donor financing goes well beyond the belief that it 
would improve campaign finance to the view that it can revolutionize 
American politics and, as a result, save our deeply-troubled political process. 
Small-donor money, for example, has been proclaimed a way to 
“reclaim” our republic19 and a “21st Century Solution” for fixing a broken 
campaign finance system.20  Mark Schmitt, a long-standing advocate for 
small-donor financing and not one normally to get carried away in unbridled 
bursts of reformist enthusiasm, has frequently extolled the “revolutionary 
potential of [a] small-donor democracy.”21  Reform organizations tout small-
donor financing as potentially having “profound” and “transformative 
power” for American democracy.22 
 
 18 Stephanie Saul & Rachel Shorey, Republicans Seek to Boost Small Donations, But a Fragmented System 
Stymies Them, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/04/us/politics/
republican-campaign-donations.html.  
 19 Lawrence Lessig, We the People and the Republic We Must Reclaim, TED (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/lawrence_lessig_we_the_people_and_the_republic_we_must_reclai
m?language=en.  
 20 See ADAM SKAGGS & FRED WERTHEIMER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., EMPOWERING SMALL 
DONORS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS 13 (2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/2019-08/Report_Empowering_Small_Donors_Federal_Elections.pdf [hereinafter Brennan 
Center Report]. 
 21 Mark Schmitt, Can Money Be a Force for Good?, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 12, 2008), 
http://prospect.org/article/can-money-be-force-good; see also MARK SCHMITT, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST., POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY:  A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 9 
(2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/A_New_Framework_for
_Democratic_Reform.pdf.  
 22 See, e.g., Brennan Center Report, supra note 20, at 2 (“[T]he transformative power of a small donor 
matching program would be profound . . . .”).  
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Nor is this advocacy confined to academic circles or the usual political-
reform organizations.  Establishment as well as insurgent political candidates 
at the highest level have heralded the promise of small donors, with messages 
that small donor money can “restore balance to our political system.”23  In 
the 2016 Democratic primary, both Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders 
campaigned on a platform that would amplify the voice and influence of 
small donors.24  And most of the usual reform organizations, including the 
Brennan Center,25 Demos,26 Public Citizen,27 the League of Women 
Voters,28 the U.S. Public Interest Research Group,29 the Brookings 
Institution,30 and the Campaign Finance Institute31 have strongly endorsed 
the mission of placing small donors at the heart of the campaign-finance 
system.  
 
 23 Ian Vandewalker & Lawrence Norden, Small Donors Still Aren’t as Important as Wealthy Ones, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/campaign-
finance-fundraising-citizens-united/504425/.   
 24 Hillary Clinton’s Proposals to Restore Integrity to American Elections, HILLARY FOR AMERICA (Sept. 8, 
2015), https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2015/09/08/restore-integrity-to-elec
tions/ [https://perma.cc/DR2J-DZ74] [hereinafter Clinton Proposal]; Get Big Money out of Politics 
and Restore Democracy, BERNIE 2020 (last visited Jan. 10, 2019), https://bernie
sanders.com/issues/free-and-fair-elections/. 
 25 See, e.g., Brennan Center Report, supra note 20.  
 26 See, e.g., SEAN MCELWEE, BRIAN SCHAFFNER & JESSE RHODES, DEMOS, WHOSE VOICE, WHOSE 
CHOICE:  THE DISTORTING INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICAL DONOR CLASS IN OUR BIG-MONEY 
ELECTIONS (2016), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Whose%20Voice
%20Whose%20Choice_2.pdf [hereinafter Demos Report].  
 27 See, e.g., Towards a Small Donor Democracy in the District of Columbia:  Policy Components of a Small Donor 
Campaign Finance System, PUBLIC CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migr
ation/dc_small_donor_matching_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) [hereinafter Public 
Citizen Proposal].  
 28 See, e.g., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, League Urges U.S. Senators to Co-Sponsor We the People Act (Oct. 
24, 2017), https://www.lwv.org/expanding-voter-access/league-urges-us-senators-cosponsor-we-
people-act.  
 29 THOMAS CMAR, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND, TOWARD A SMALL DONOR DEMOCRACY: THE 
PAST AND FUTURE OF INCENTIVES FOR SMALL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (Sept. 2004), 
https://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Toward_A_Small_Donor_Democracy_USPIRG.pdf 
[hereinafter PIRG Report].  
 30 ANTHONY J. CORRADO ET AL., BROOKINGS INST. ET AL., REFORM IN THE AGE OF NETWORKED 
CAMPAIGNS:  HOW TO FOSTER CITIZEN PARTICIPATION THROUGH SMALL DONORS AND 
VOLUNTEERS (2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0114_campa
ign_finance_reform.pdf [hereinafter Brookings Report].  This Report was a joint report from the 
Campaign Finance Institute, American Enterprise Institute, and the Brookings Institution.  
 31 Id.  
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Enthusiasts for small-donors and their potential often portray small 
donors as average, representative citizens.  For example, matching-funds 
programs based on small donors have been described as a way to “put 
everyday Americans back at the center of our government.”32  Small-donor 
financing is said to “unleash the voices of ordinary citizens”33 and allow 
“average Americans [to] play a more meaningful role in influencing” who 
wins public office.34  Along the same lines, Hillary Clinton, during the 2016 
campaign, asserted that a small-donor matching system would “increase the 
role and influence of everyday Americans.”35  Indeed, the ability to build 
“small-donor” armies is now being said to be crucial to establishing 
credibility in the presidential primaries for the 2020 election; small-donors 
will be, it is argued, the “new straw poll” for these primaries.36  To the extent 
there is an “invisible primary”37 before the actual primaries, that primary 
might soon be conducted among small donors.    
Among the other benefits touted on behalf of small-donor financing, 
reformers often claim that small-donors are not seeking to influence policy 
decisions; that their money is free of the taint of corruption that characterizes 
many other sources of money; or that, to the extent small-donors do have a 
distinct agenda, that is all to the good because it will offset the (corrupt) policy 
agenda of large donors.  For example, some civic organizations endorse 
small-donor financing because it would “provid[e] candidates with the 
opportunity to raise the money needed to compete for elective office without 
having to depend on . . . donors seeking to influence policy decisions.”38  
Other proponents press the claim that small donors’ preferences will “offset” 
 
 32 Nick Nyhart, Empowering Small Donors in Elections Will Strengthen Democracy, EVERY VOICE (Sept. 11 
2015), https://everyvoice.org/featured/empowering-small-donors-elections-will-strengthen-demo
cracy.  
 33 Brennan Center Report, supra note 20, at 13.  
 34 PIRG Report, supra note 29, at 3.  
 35 See Clinton Proposal, supra note 24. 
 36 Elena Schneider, “The New Straw Poll:”  2020 Candidate Race to Build Small-Donor Armies, POLITICO 
(Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/05/2020-elections-small-donor-
fundraising-democrats-actblue-1081892. 
 37 See MARTY COHEN ET AL., THE PARTY DECIDES:  PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS BEFORE AND 
AFTER REFORM 10–16 (2008) (defining the “invisible primary” as the initial work candidates do to 
“take polls, raise money, identify active supporters in the states with early primaries, and compete 
for the services of respected consultants”). 
 38 ANTHONY CORRADO, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., PROMOTING SMALL DONOR DEMOCRACY:  
THE VALUE OF PUBLIC MATCHING PROGRAMS 13 (Mar. 2013), https://www.ced.org/pdf/
Promoting-Small-Donor-Democracy.pdf.  
 
352 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
   
 
or “[m]oderate the influence” of large donors.39  Still other advocates assert 
that that “big donors diverge from the general public . . . on most key policy 
issues,”40 and emphasize that small-donor money can work to counteract the 
big-donor money that “skews our political system.”41  These views are 
premised on the assumption that small donors are representative of average 
Americans or perhaps the average American voter. 
Reformers also suggest that small-donor-financed elections would create 
better candidates and legislators.  Small-donor money, we are told, will result 
in “good legislators” rather than legislators with “well-heeled networks and 
fundraising abilities . . . .”42  Others agree, predicting we would see a 
“measurable change in the types of candidates” who run,43 implying that 
these new candidates would hold policy views closer to those of average 
citizens.  Over time, we would see a “more effective legislature” as well as a 
decrease in polarization.44  An increase in small-donor contributions, it is 
said, would “improve candidate competition and voter choice, while 
strengthening civic participation in the electoral process.”45 
In all the advocacy and endorsement of small-donor financing, it is hard 
to find any voices suggesting any potential downside to small-donor money, 
let alone any resistance to a greater role for such financing.  As one of the 
most visible players in the reform community—the Brennan Center— 
confidently concluded, “[t]here can be no doubt that small donors . . . play a 
. . . positive role in our politics.”46  In the eyes of much of the reform 
community, small-donor financing would not only “significantly enhance the 
quality of democracy in the United States,”47 but it would also “restore 
citizens to their rightful pre-eminent place in our democracy.”48    
 
 39 Mark Schmitt, Small Donor Empowerment:  A New Menu of Options To Strengthen the Voice of Citizens, NEW 
AM. (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/policy-papers/small-donor-
empowerment/; see also PIRG Report, supra note 29, at 3 (noting the possibility of “encourage[ing] 
a wave of small contributions that will help balance out the undue influence of large donors”).  
 40 Demos Report, supra note 26, at 46; see also PIRG Report, supra note 29, at 8 (“Wealthy donors have 
political preferences and concerns that are distinct from those of other Americans . . . .”). 
 41 Demos Report, supra note 26, at 46.  
 42 Demos Report, supra note 26, at 48.  
 43 Schmitt, supra note 39.  
 44 Id.  
 45 Brookings Report, supra note 30, at 26.  
 46 Brennan Center Report, supra note 20, at 1 (emphasis added).  
 47 Brookings Report, supra note 30, at 53.  
 48 Brennan Center Report, supra note 20, at 23.  
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B.  The Rise of Small-Donor Financing  
Before the 2018 midterm elections, small-donor financing had only 
played a major role in presidential elections.  Barack Obama was the first 
presidential candidate to seize the advantages Internet fundraising presented, 
particularly for raising money from small donors ($200 or less).49   His ability 
to raise money from individual donors, large and small, was the main reason 
he was the first major-party candidate to abandon public financing for his 
2008 general election campaign.50   In the 2008 general election, he raised 
$114.1 million from small donors, which constituted 34% of the contribution 
dollars to his general election campaign.51  By taking advantage of the donor 
list he built during that first run, by the 2011–2012 cycle he was able to 
generate $218.8 million from small donors, which was 28% of his revenue 
(Mitt Romney raised $57.5 million, or 12% of total contributions, from small 
donors).52   
In 2016, Donald Trump became the most successful candidate ever in 
raising money from small donors, measured either in aggregate dollars or in 
the percentage of his total contributions.  In total small-donor dollars for the 
2015–2016 cycle, Trump brought in $238.6 million.53  This figure is 
particularly striking because, in the primaries, Trump self-financed half of 
the contributions to his campaign.54  Moreover, small donations ($200 or less) 
 
 49 See, e.g., Abbey Levenshus, Online Relationship Management in a Presidential Campaign: A Case Study of the 
Obama Campaign’s Management of Its Internet-Integrated Grassroots Effort, 22 J. PUB. REL. RES. 313, 317–
18 (2010); AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE INTERNET’S ROLE IN CAMPAIGN 2008 
(2009), available at https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-cam
paign-2008/ (characterizing the presidential campaign as “the first Internet election”). 
 50 See Adam Nagourney & Jeff Zeleny, Obama to Bypass Public Financing in the General Election, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 19, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/world/americas/19iht-campaign.3.138
34230.html (reporting Barack Obama’s announcement to opt out of public financing and his 
reasoning as addressed to donors: “[i]nstead of forcing us to rely on millions from Washington 
lobbyists and special interest PACs, you've fueled this campaign with donations of $5, $10, $20 
. . . .”) 
 51 The data in this paragraph, taken from a Campaign Finance Institute report, aggregate total 
contributions by an individual over a two-year election cycle, including contributions to joint 
fundraising committees that are attributable to the candidate.  Thus, someone who gives $150 to 
the primary for a candidate and $100 to that same candidate for the general election is not a small 
donor for these purposes, given that the aggregate contribution is over $200.  See Analysis of the Final 
2016 Presidential Campaign Finance Reports, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (Feb. 27, 2017), 
http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/17-02-21/President_Trump_with_RNC_Help_Raised_
More_Small_Donor_Money_than_President_Obama_As_Much_As_Clinton_and_Sanders
_Combined.aspx (follow Table 4 hyperlink) [hereinafter CFI Report]. 
 52 Id. at tbl.3. 
 53 Id. at tbl.2. 
 54 Id. 
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made up 69% of the individual contributions to Trump’s campaign and 58% 
of the Trump campaign’s total receipts.55  Trump did dramatically better 
than Hillary Clinton ($138 million) among small donors; he raised about 
$100 million more than she did, for the primary and general election 
combined, which is all the more striking because of the role of self-financing 
in his primary campaign.     
Of the primary candidates who did not make it to the general election in 
2016, the two who benefitted most from small donors were Ben Carson and 
Bernie Sanders.  More than half of Carson’s total contributions came from 
small donors, and Sanders raised $99.7 million (about 44% of his total 
contributions) from small donors.56  In contrast, four of the Republican 
candidates raised the vast majority of their money from donors who 
contributed the legal maximum of $2700 (Jeb Bush, Chris Christie, Bobby 
Jindal, and Rick Perry).57  Sanders also pioneered a new technique for raising 
small donations; much of Sanders’ small money came through intermediary 
online platforms, such as the entity ActBlue, which enabled donors to go to 
a single one-stop donation site and contribute to any candidate or 
organization that has signed up with ActBlue (in contrast, small donors to the 
Obama campaigns had to go to the campaign’s own website to donate).  
Indeed, the single biggest night of political donations to ActBlue came the 
night Sanders won the New Hampshire primary, when 20,000 contributions 
arrived in ten minutes, after Sanders requested such donations during his 
victory speech.58   
But outside presidential campaigns, small donations had played a minor 
role until 2018.  In 2016, for example, small donors accounted for only about 
6% of the money raised by House candidates.  The 2018 midterms, however, 
brought a quantum jump in small donations to House and Senate races.  
Overall, Democratic Senate candidates raised 27% of their money from 
small donors; Democratic House candidates raised 16%.  ActBlue raised 
more than $1.6 billion dollars for Democratic candidates and causes overall 
 
 55 Id. at 1.  
 56 Id. at 1. 
 57 Id. at tbl.2. 
 58 See Alex Roarty, How Online Money is Reshaping the Democratic Party, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Aug. 
23, 2018), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/election/article217164
250.html. 
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in the 2018 election cycle.59  That was an 80% increase from what had been 
raised through ActBlue four years earlier.60  Through September of 2018, 
the average donation had been around $34.61  By the end of the 2018 
campaign, it had become clear to Democratic candidates that “it’s how 
campaigns are building from the first day, knowing that small donors are a 
strategic part of their constituency, and that they have to build these small-
dollar networks in order to be viable.”62  Indeed, the Democratic Party made 
certain levels of success with small-donors one of the factors that determine 
which of its candidates, during the presidential primaries, made the “main 
debate” stage.63  If this level of small donations continues going forward—a 
question discussed further below—it might amount to a revolution in the way 
elections are financed for Congress.64  
What kind of candidates benefitted most from this explosion in small 
donations?  The biggest winner on the House side from small donations was 
far and away, as might be expected, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who 
raised about 62% of her money from small donors (under $200).65  Among 
Republicans, the three candidates who raised the highest percentage of their 
 
 59 Lisa Lerer, ActBlue, the Democrats’ Not-So-Secret Weapon, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/politics/on-politics-actblue-democrats.html. 
 60 Id.  
 61 Roarty, supra note 58.  
 62 Id.  
 63 Julie Bykowicz, For Democrats in 2020, Small Donors are Gauge of Fundraising Success, WALL STREET J. 
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-democrats-in-2020-small-donors-are-gauge-of-
fundraising-success-11547726400. 
 64 Because Super PACs have become such visible players in the campaign finance system in recent 
years, it is worth noting, perhaps surprisingly to some, that individual donors are also the biggest 
contributors to Super PACs.  These are often the same individuals who make large contributions 
to other participants, such as candidates and parties, and might have reached their maximum 
contribution caps or have other reasons for donating to Super PACs.  In 2016, Super PACs 
accounted for about 16% of total election spending.  NATHANIEL PERSILY ET AL., BIPARTISAN 
POL’Y CTR., CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES:  ASSESSING AN ERA OF 
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 38 (2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
BPC-Democracy-Campaign-Finance-in-the-United-States.pdf [hereinafter Persily Report].  About 
62% of their money came from individuals; organizations supplied the remaining 38% (of the 
organizations that contribute, unions play a significant role, but corporations “are not big 
contributors to Super PACs from their treasury funds).”  Id. at 40; see also Paul S. Herrnson, The 
Impact of Organizational Characteristics on Super PAC Financing and Independent Expenditures 
28 (June 2017) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Meeting of the Campaign Finance Task 
Force, Bipartisan Policy Center), available at https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/05/The-Impact-of-Organizational-Characteristics-on-Super-PAC-Financing-and-Indepen
dent-Expenditures.pdf. 
 65 David Wright, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Led with Percentage of Small Dollar Donors in 2018, CNN (Dec. 
18, 2018, 11:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/18/politics/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-
small-dollar-donors-open-secrets/index.html. 
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funding from small donors were Rep. Devin Nunes (who raised 49% of his 
funds from small donors and who used his role as Chairman of the House 
Intelligence Committee to defend President Trump against the Mueller 
investigation); Rep. Steve Scalise (outgoing House majority whip); and Rep. 
Mark Meadows (chair of the House Freedom Caucus).66  On the Senate side, 
those whose war chests were most heavily funded by small donors were 
Democrats Bernie Sanders (a remarkable 77%) and Elizabeth Warren (56%); 
then the Republican Corey Stewart (50%), who lost his Senate race in 
Virginia; and the also-losing Democrat, Beto O’Rourke (46%).67  In light of 
this, it is no surprise that a 2020 presidential candidate who had realized how 
successful she could be with small donors, Elizabeth Warren, then led a 
charge for fellow candidates to renounce Super Pac support, eschew events 
for large donors, and renounce self-financing. All this was designed, of 
course, to make all the candidates strongly depend upon small donors.68 
Moreover, small-donor contributions, like much else on the Internet, also 
appear to be fueled by viral moments, by outrage, and by the culture of 
celebrity.  As a New York Times article regarding the presidential nominations 
process put it, after analyzing six years of online donations, “the art of 
inspiring online donors is very much about timing:  It’s about having a 
moment in the national spotlight—and then capitalizing on it.”69  One 
example was Sen. Cory Booker’s “I am Spartacus” moment, which was 
widely mocked but nonetheless produced the second-best day for small 
donations to his campaign up to that point.70  Similarly in February 2017, 
when Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell cut off Sen. Elizabeth 
Warren from further speaking on the Senate floor, saying later that 
“nevertheless, she persisted” in speaking after being warned to stop, the 
moment immediately went viral.  The next day, Sen. Warren received 
27,000 online donations—two and a half times more than on any prior day 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 Karl Evers-Hillstrom, The Most (And Least) Popular Candidates Among Small Donors, OPENSECRETS 
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/11/popular-candidates-4-small-don
ors/. 
 68 Julia Conley, Shunning Corporate Donors and Pledging People-Powered Campaign, Warren Shuttering 
Fundraising PAC, COMMON DREAMS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/news/
2019/01/03/shunning-corporate-donors-and-pledging-people-powered-campaign-warren-shutte
ring. 
 69 Shane Goldmacher, 6 Days When 2020 Democratic Hopefuls Scored with Small Donors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/us/politics/democrats-donations-2020.html. 
 70 Id. 
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since 2013.71  When President Trump came to Nevada during the Senate 
race and called the Democratic candidate, Rep. Jacky Rosen, “Wacky 
Jacky,” that moment went viral and immediately boosted Rosen’s small 
donations; the next day, she received one-third of all the small donations she 
collected for that entire quarter of fundraising.72  Do we want to dramatically 
amplify these moments by providing $6 in public funds for every $1 raised in 
these ways?  Similarly, the more obscure former tech. executive, Andrew 
Yang, saw his individual contributions take off after he did a podcast with 
Joe Rogan, a comedian and mixed-martial arts commentator; Yang 
averaged 62 donations per day in the thirty days before the podcast, then 
2150 in the thirty days after it.73   
One of the effects of the rise of small donors is more widespread (if still 
narrow) participation in contributing to campaigns.  Despite all the 
complaints about the role of money in elections, campaign financing in one 
sense has never been more broadly participatory.  Vastly more people now 
donate money to campaigns, no doubt in part because the Internet has 
reduced the transaction costs between campaigns and individual donors.  For 
example, according to self-reported figures from the American National 
Election Survey, the percentage of people who report donating to an 
individual running for office within the last year has doubled since 1992.  
Back then, 6% of people reported having done so; in 2016, 12% so 
reported.74  In 1982, only 65,970 people donated to presidential or 
congressional candidate campaigns; in 2016, 3.2 million did so.75  Of this 
remarkable 487% percent increase in fourteen election cycles, much of that 
increase is concentrated in recent election cycles (nonetheless, this number 
remains less than 2% of the adult population).  
Reflecting the rise of small donors, the average size of donations from 
individuals has gone down significantly over time.  In 1980, the average total 
 
 71 Id.  
 72 See Julie Bykowicz, Democrats Outperforming Republicans in Small Donations, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 5, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-outperforming-republicans-in-small-donations-1
536139801. 
 73 Shane Goldmacher et al., The 5 Days that Defined the 2020 Primary, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/17/us/politics/2020-democratic-fundraising.ht
ml. 
 74 Adam Hughes, 5 Facts about U.S. Political Donations, PEW RES. CTR. (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/17/5-facts-about-u-s-political-donations/.  
 75 Zachary Albert, Campaign Finance Task Force, Trends in Campaign Financing, 1980–2016, at 17 (2017), 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Trends-in-Campaign-Financing-
1980-2016.-Zachary-Albert..pdf [hereinafter Albert Report]; see also Persily Report, supra note 64, 
at 22. 
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individual donation was over $2000; by 2016, it had fallen to under $1000.  
Starting in 2008, the number of individual small donors (defined here as under 
$500) begins to exceed the number of donors who give in any other dollar 
category (over $10,000; $1000–10,000; or $500–1000).76 
But all this greater participation in terms of numbers of people must be 
kept in context.  Even as vastly more people participate through 
contributions and the average donation has gone down, individual 
contributions to campaigns have still become concentrated among a smaller 
number of very large donors.  Thus, in 1980, the top 25% of all donors 
contributed about 58% of all funds.77  By 2010, that top quartile was 
contributing 85% of all funds, and in 2016, the top 25% gave about 90% of 
all funds (and just the top 5% of donors gave 61% of all funds).78  Put in other 
terms, in 2000, half of all donations came from 73,926 individuals; in 2016, 
only 15,810 individuals accounted for half of all donations.79    
II.  SMALL DONORS AND POLARIZATION 
Individual donors are among the most ideologically extreme of the major 
sources of contributions to American campaigns, as noted above.  To 
complete the picture and set the stage for the discussion of small donors and 
political polarization, consider the other major sources of funding for 
campaigns:  the political parties, business groups, unions, and issue groups 
(the latter three are all PACs).  Not surprisingly, political-party financial 
contributions flow heavily to centrist candidates; parties donate about twice 
as much to candidates in the middle of the ideological spectrum as to their 
candidates at the poles.80  Parties, of course, are incentivized to seek partisan 
control and domination of legislative bodies, and as a result, they contribute 
to their competitive candidates (challengers as well as incumbents) without 
regard to political ideology.  These incentives lead parties to contribute 
significantly more to centrist candidates than extreme ones.  Business PACs 
tend to give more to moderates, with an edge to conservative moderates, but 
 
 76 Albert Report, supra note 75, at 17. 
 77 Id. at 17–19. 
 78 Id. at 18–19. 
 79 Persily Report, supra note 64, at 22. 
 80 RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL 
POLARIZATION:  WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL 71 (2015).   
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not extreme conservatives.  Issue groups show a bimodal distribution, with 
more money to the extremes on the conservative side than the liberal side, 
but they provide a proportionately small amount of campaign funds.81  And 
unions tend to donate to those on the extreme liberal end of the ideological 
spectrum.82   
These differences reflect the different motivations for giving these actors 
have.  Business groups primarily appear to give for access-oriented reasons; 
they give only 5% of their money to challengers and 77% to incumbents, 
with the rest going to candidates in uncontested races.  Unions also primarily 
donate to incumbents.  The group that distributes its contributions most 
evenly between incumbents (35%) and challengers (30%) is, not surprisingly, 
political parties.83   
With respect to individual donors, we can explore the relationship to 
ideological polarization in three different but overlapping contexts.  For each 
category, this Article first summarizes the research on individual donors in 
general and then turns in particular to what we know about small donors.  It 
is important to note that much of the empirical data we have to date is about 
individual donors in general.  Only a few studies have thus far attempted to 
do detailed work that isolates small donors from other individual donors; 
finding and analyzing data on small donors is difficult and costly to do.  Thus, 
many of the claims in this Article are about how individual donors in general 
compare to other sources of campaign contributions, such as from PACs or 
other organizational actors.  But to the extent we can disaggregate 
information about small donors from individual donors in general, nothing 
suggests that small donors are less polarizing sources of money than large 
individual donors.84   
Section A briefly describes the “pre-history” of today’s more 
technologically sophisticated small-donor financing:  the use of direct mail 
campaigns to raise money from small donors.  In the era in which direct mail 
 
 81 Id.  
 82 Id.; see, e.g., Michael Barber, Donation Motivations:  Testing Theories of Access and Ideology, 69 POL. RES. 
Q. 148 (2016) (identifying the contribution motivation of political action committees based on 
empirical survey data); Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace, 57 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 294 (2013) (measuring the ideology of candidates and political action committees using 
contribution-level data).  
 83 LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80,at 72. 
 84 In the academic literature, political scientists do not use the term “small donor” consistently.  Some 
use the terms “small donor” or “low-dollar donor” to describe donors who gave less than $100; 
others use it to describe donors who give up to $500.  This Article tries to adhere to the most 
conventional definition of a small donor, which is someone whose total contributions come to $200 
or less; when an article uses “small donor” to mean something else, that different use of the term 
will be flagged.   
360 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
   
 
played a significant role, there is little doubt that the most successful direct-
mail fundraisers from small donors came from the ideological extremes of 
each party. 
Section B then surveys the existing literature that directly assesses the 
current policy preferences and ideology of individual donors and small 
donors.  The research shows that people who choose to donate to campaigns 
are among the most ideologically extreme citizens: they are more extreme 
than nondonors; more extreme than primary or general-election voters; and 
more extreme than even those who can be defined as “active partisans” in 
other ways.  On this front, there is no consensus yet on whether small donors 
in particular hold more ideological beliefs or policy positions than large 
donors.  
Section C next examines the relationship between individual donors and 
the candidates to whom they give money.  Regardless of the donor’s own 
ideology or motivations, empirical studies thus far confirm that “extreme” or 
ideological candidates receive more money from individuals than do 
moderate candidates.  Small donors have been singled out in some of these 
studies, and they also contribute more to ideologically extreme candidates 
than to moderate candidates.  Historically, small donors have contributed 
extensively to candidates or officeholders from the ends of the ideological 
spectrum, such as Michele Bachmann or Alan West.  Ideologically extreme 
candidates or officeholders like these also receive more media coverage, 
however, and thus it can be difficult to disentangle how much it is ideology 
per se—as opposed to greater exposure—that accounts for this pattern.  
From a policy perspective, that distinction might nonetheless not matter if 
we are considering the merits of individual-donation-based financing with 
alternatives like public financing.  
Section D turns to exploring the existing literature on the motivations 
that lead individual donors to donate.  For all individual donors, the ideology 
or issue positions of the candidates is consistently the most important factor 
in the decision to donate.  In addition, there is persuasive evidence that 
donors do not make general donations to their party of choice, but instead 
make sophisticated choices among candidates who best match their policy 
preferences.  In addition, individual donors are more likely to donate when 
they hold strongly unfavorable views of the opposing candidate or party.  
Finally, we know that the most ideologically extreme donors are the ones 
most likely to be motivated by ideology itself when choosing to donate. 
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Motivation for giving is the area where small donors and large donors 
appear to diverge the most.  Small donors are more likely than large donors 
to say that a candidate’s ideology or views on social and moral issues 
motivated them make a contribution. 
A.  Small Donors Before the Internet and Social Media 
The modern era of campaign financing began in the 1970s, with the 
Federal Election Campaign Finance Act of 1971 and later amendments in 
1974.  This legislation, for the first time, imposed contribution caps on 
donations to campaigns (as well as spending limits, which were struck down 
in Buckley v. Valeo85).  Before this time, candidates typically were able to raise 
large amounts from individual donors.  But the potential for direct-mail 
fundraising from small donors was first revealed, out of necessity, during 
Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign.  While more traditional GOP candidates 
could rely on the GOP’s stable of big-money donors, Goldwater, an 
ideological insurgent, could not (indeed, even after he won the nomination, 
not a single Republican figure of national stature, other than Richard Nixon, 
endorsed Goldwater86).  Needing to find an alternative source of fundraising, 
Goldwater turned to direct mail.87  The strategy was financially successful.  
Goldwater received approximately 380,000 direct-mail contributions in 
sums under $100—in total,  Goldwater raised $5.8 million in total from 
direct mail.88  
Direct-mail fundraising entailed mass mailing of appeals to potential 
donors along with a return envelope to make it easy for the recipient to 
donate.  Much like today’s collection of email lists, an adept direct-mail 
strategy played the long game, accruing coveted donor lists and using data 
from previous campaigns to more effectively target potential donors in later 
campaigns.89  But unlike today’s Internet and social-media fundraising, 
 
 85 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam).   
 86 RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND:  THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING OF AMERICA 
64 (2008). 
 87 Dan Nowicki, Direct Mail Another Legacy of ‘64 Goldwater Campaign, REPUBLIC (Apr. 12, 2014), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/azdc/2014/04/13/direct-mail-goldwater-legacy/7622041/.  
 88 HERBERT M. BAUS & WILLIAM B. ROSS, POLITICS BATTLE PLAN 73 (1968); Herbert E. 
Alexander, Financing the Parties and Campaigns, in THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1964, at 179 (Milton 
C. Cummings ed., 1966). 
 89 Shane D’Aprile, The Staggering Price of Money, POL. MAG., May 2010, at 30.  
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direct-mail fundraising was costly.90  As donor lists became more refined, 
direct mail also became more cost efficient.  While direct mail started off as 
high minded and transparent, by the 1980s fundraisers had found that 
extreme forms of messaging were the most effective.91  
After Goldwater’s $5.8 million direct fundraising haul, other candidates 
sought to cash in.  Nixon raised $2.2 million in 1968 by direct mail and $9 
million in 1972 (which was only 15% of his contributions).92  On the 
Democratic side, George McGovern was the first and only Democratic 
candidate to find success with direct-mail fundraising.93  With the help of a 
then-young civil rights lawyer and emerging expert in direct mail, Morris 
Dees,94 McGovern raised a remarkable 50% of his funds in 1972 through 
direct mail ($15 million).95  George Wallace was also one of the most 
successful direct-mail fundraisers of the era, particularly given how much his 
campaign relied on small donors.  In 1968, he raised 76% of his funds in the 
primaries from small donors, who contributed less than $100 per person;96 
in his longshot 1976 run for the Democratic nomination, he raised roughly 
 
 90 A successful campaign in the 1970s cost 30% of the gross intake, though that number could vary 
based off of the persuasiveness of the appeal, the skill of the donor targeting operation, and the 
ethics of the operative who conducts the campaign.  Haggerty, supra note 88, at 14.  
 91 Compare Laurence Jaeger, Can McGovern Be Sold Through the Mails?, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 18, 1972, at 46 
(discussing McGovern’s direct fundraising appeals) with Gregg Easterbrook, Junk-Mail Politics, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Apr. 25, 1988, at 17–21 (discussing in detail various kinds of less than ethical strategies 
engaged in by both liberals and conservatives).  
 92 HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS:  MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 
92 (1976); Haggerty, supra note 88, at 11 (discussing 1972 statistics); Christopher Lydon, Fund Raising 
by Mail Works for McGovern, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1971), http://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/
20/archives/fund-raising-by-mail-works-for-mcgovern.html (discussing 1968 statistics).  The  $9 
million figure is given for the “Nixon campaign” direct mail gross.  ALEXANDER, supra.  Later in 
the paragraph, Alexander states that direct mail drives “conducted by the RNC alone and 
conducted jointly with the Committee to Re-Elect the President” raised $14.3 million after the 
convention.  The relationship between these two numbers is unclear.  It is also unclear whether the 
$14.3 million number also includes fundraising directed towards congressional candidates.  
 93 Surprisingly, Eugene McCarthy did not make much use of it, raising just $1 million of $11 million 
total through direct mail.  Lydon, supra note 92.  
 94 PERLSTEIN, supra note 86, at 639. 
 95 HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS:  MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 
20, 90–91 (1976); see also Haggerty, supra note 88, at 11 (estimating a $10.5 million net from direct 
mail).  But see Brooks Jackson, Pulling in the Money: Hart’s Direct-Mail Drive Pays Off, WALL STREET J., 
Apr. 3, 1984, at 60 (estimating a net of $19 million from direct mail).  
 96 See Haggerty, supra note 88, at 11.  
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$10.5 million from direct mail, which was 67% of his funds, despite a serious 
physical disability from an assassination attempt.97  
Direct-mail fundraising was, without doubt, most helpful to candidates 
who were more ideologically extreme.  Goldwater, McGovern, and Wallace 
were the most extreme presidential candidates of the era.  The shift towards 
increasingly overwrought fundraising appeals over time shows how such 
appeals turned out to be more effective.  The king of direct-mail appeals was 
the conservative Richard Viguerie.  He explained that “[c]andidates who 
have strong views, well thought out views on the right or the left, are going 
to be able to attract more small donors than candidates who are less 
controversial, if you would, who are less outspoken, who are in the mushy 
middle, so to speak.”98  As he noted, direct mail allowed candidates to bypass 
moderating institutions like the mainstream media when fundraising99 
(Viguerie was so effective that McGovern tried to hire him for his 1968 
Senate race, but Viguerie declined100).   
Indeed, the success of this mode of fundraising has been offered as part 
of the reason that Republican Party positions on social issues shifted 
dramatically to the right in this era; Professor Reva Siegel attributes this shift 
to the direct-mail fundraising campaigns by Viguerie and others.101  In a 
similar vein, the journalist Robert Kuttner argues that concerns about 
empowering ideological extremists caused DNC Chair Robert Strauss to 
discard the McGovern fundraising list and generally avoid direct mail 
fundraising after the McGovern campaign (though this is disputed).102  
 
 97 HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 292, 718 (1979). 
 98 McGovern Campaign Marked Beginning of Direct Mail, NPR (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.npr.org/
2012/08/01/157739995/mcgovern-campaign-marked-beginning-of-direct-mail.  McGovern’s 
version of Viguerie was Morris Dees, a successful marketer who suggested adding a fundraising 
appeal to a letter supporting his candidacy.  Id.  
 99 Haggerty, supra note 88, at 12 (citing Clay Richards, Two Million Letters a Week for Key Causes, SAN 
DIEGO UNION, C-5 (Jan. 22, 1978)) (quoting an interview given at a Washington Journalism Center 
seminar).  George Gorton, a direct mail fundraiser for the RNC and President Ford said that direct 
mail only really works with donors who are “true believers.”  Id.  
 100 PERLSTEIN, supra note 86, at 639. 
 101 Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
191, 212–14 (2008) (discussing the direct mail strategy’s effectiveness in allowing Republicans to 
“bypass the traditional media” in promoting the “restoration of the Constitution in matters 
concerning criminal defendants’ rights, gun control, and other ‘social issues,’ including prayer, 
busing, and abortion.”). 
 102 Robert Kuttner, Ass Backward, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 1985, at 18.  But see PHILIP A. KLINKNER, 
THE LOSING PARTIES:  OUT-PARTY NATIONAL COMMITTEES 1956–1993, at 126–28 (1994) 
(contending that DNC leadership did make genuine but ill-fated attempts to use McGovern’s donor 
list and pursue direct mail fundraising).  Klinkner attributes the comparatively weak returns of the 
Democratic fundraising during this period to a lack of ideological extremism.  
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Similarly, in the 1976 election, Jimmy Carter brought on Morris Dees, 
McGovern’s direct-mail guru, as national finance chairman, but despite 
Dees’ expertise in direct mail, he decided other fundraising strategies had to 
be employed for Carter, because Carter was too centrist a candidate for 
direct mail to be effective.103  
Thus, in the era of direct mail, small donors were more ideologically 
extreme than even large donors.  Experience with small-donor financing in 
the age of direct mail raises questions about whether today’s technologically 
transformed small-donor financing systems will be prone to the same 
dynamics. 
B.  Policy Preferences and Ideology of Individual Donors Today 
1.  All Individual Donors 
Political scientists have long known that individual donors are more 
ideological than non-donors.104  This is what is known as the “U-Shape of 
Political Activism.”  As a recent Pew Research Center report put it, “those 
who hold consistently liberal or conservative views, and who hold strongly 
negative views of the other political party, are far more likely to participate 
in the political process than the rest of the nation”—particularly with respect 
to campaign donations.105  In a recent study of both large and small donors 
to state-level elections, for example, La Raja & Schaffner confirmed that “all 
[individual] donors are unrepresentative in their high degree of polarization 
compared to nondonor adults.”106  As shown in the figure below, the 
distribution of donors is bimodal, with most donors falling on either the very 
liberal or very conservative side of the ideological spectrum.  Nondonor 
 
 103 HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 722 (1979). 
 104 For some of the important work demonstrating this, some of which is discussed below, see, e.g., LA 
RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80, at 37; Michael J. Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and 
the Polarization of American Legislatures, 78 J. POL. 296 (2016); Michael J. Barber et al., Ideologically 
Sophisticated Donors:  Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 271 (2017); 
Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization 20 (Aug. 
13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.andrewbenjaminhall.com/Hall_publicfund
ing.pdf. 
 105 PEW RES. CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, SECTION 5:  POLITICAL 
ENGAGEMENT AND ACTIVISM, at 1–2 (2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-
5-political-engagement-and-activism/. 
 106 LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80, at 47.  More of La Raja & Schaffner’s work is included in 
the section on small donors.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
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adults “are distributed more evenly across the issue scale.”107  The differences 
are striking, though perhaps not entirely surprising: 
Figure 1: Distributions of Issue Positions of Donors  
Compared to Other Adults108 
Similarly, another significant study of both small and large donors to 
presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012 found that contributors were 
“more strongly partisan and more ideological than non-donors.”109  In 2008, 
for example, only 16% of donors described themselves as “Moderate/Middle 
of the Road” or did not report an ideology, while approximately 45% of non-
donors described themselves in this way.110 
The most recent empirical work continues to generate even more 
dramatic findings along similar lines.  In the largest survey of campaign 
donors thus far undertaken, the results showed “extremely large differences” 
in ideology between donors and non-donor partisans of either party.111  The 
extent of these differences vary based on party affiliation the specific policy 
 
 107 LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80, at 47. (demonstrating the high degree of polarization across 
the political spectrum within the donor class as compared to non-donors).  
 108 Id. 
 109 DAVID B. MAGLEBY, JAY GOODLIFFE & JOSEPH OLSEN, WHO DONATES IN CAMPAIGNS?  THE 
IMPORTANCE OF MESSAGE, MESSENGER, MEDIUM, AND STRUCTURE 352 (2018) (discussing the 
data compiled on contemporary campaign donors in general elections).  
 110 Id. at 191 & n.64 (“In 2008, 11% of donors describe themselves as moderate; 16% of donors in 
2012. In 2008, 41% of voters (donor and non-donor) described themselves as moderate; 35% of 
voters in 2012”).  
 111 David Broockman & Neil Malhotra, What Do Donors Want?  Heterogeneity by Party and Policy 
Domain 2 (Nov. 30, 2018) (Research Note), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3288862. 
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area involved.  Thus, on economic issues Republican donors are much more 
conservative than other Republicans; strikingly, this gap between Republicans 
is as large as the gap on economic issues between non-donating Republicans 
and Democrats.112  To make this concrete:  on health care, 52% of 
Republican donors but only 23% of other Republicans strongly disagree that 
the government should make sure that all Americans have health 
insurance.113  On social issues, Republican donors and other Republicans are 
more closely aligned.  On the Democratic side, donors are considerably more 
liberal on social issues than other Democrats; on economic issues, 
Democratic donors and non-donors are more in sync.114  And both 
Republican and Democratic donors are more “pro-globalism” than other 
supporters of either party.115  To the extent elected officials reflect the views 
of donors more than other partisans, in part because campaign finance rests 
so heavily on individual donors, these donations push Republican 
representatives further to the right on economic issues and Democratic ones 
to the left on social issues than the larger mass of voters prefer for either 
party.116     
Similarly, in a 2017 study of attitudes on specific policy issues, Hill & 
Huber found that “contributors hold more extreme policy views than non-
contributors” of the same party.117  This study included both small and large 
donors, and tested for individual policy preferences across a wide range of 
political issues, including “gun control, climate change, immigration, 
abortion, jobs versus the environment, gay marriage, affirmative action, and 
fiscal policy.”118  Hill & Huber found not only that  contributors are more 
extreme in their policy views, but also that contributors are more 
 
 112 Id. (noting the vast differences between partisan donors and nondonor party members, particularly 
in the Republican party). 
 113 Id. at 6.  
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 2.  
 116 The Broockman & Malhotra study briefly notes that these patterns are even larger among the 
largest donors (those whose giving puts them in the top 1% of all donors) than among the rest of 
donors.  Id. at 7–8.  There is no more refined comparison between small donors, such as those 
giving under $250, and other donors, which makes it difficult to draw any conclusions from this 
survey whether small donors are more or less extreme than larger donors. 
 117 Seth J. Hill & Gregory A. Huber, Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate:  Results 
from Merged Survey and Administrative Records, 39 POL. BEHAV. 3, 10 (2017) (title capitalization 
removed). 
 118 Id. at 10.  
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homogeneous in their views.119  These findings are reflected in the figure 
below: 
Figure 2: Ideological Positions of Partisans Who Donate Compared to  
Partisans Who Do Not Donate120 
On specific major policy issues, individual donors are also consistently 
more liberal or conservative than non-donors.121  For example, “[o]n the 
issue of abortion, Democratic donors are consistently more liberal than 
Democratic non-donors.  The percentage that would always permit abortion 
is higher for donors than non-donors among Democrats . . . .”122  The same 
holds true for Republicans; the percentage that would always permit 
abortion is “always lower for donors than non-donors among 
Republicans.”123  And in 2008 and 2012, Democratic donors were more 
likely than Democratic non-donors to say they would “increase immigration” 
or “support same-sex marriage.”124 
In addition to comparing donors to non-donors, Hill & Huber compared 
donors to general election and primary election voters, finding that 
contributors held more ideological views than either set of voters.125  This is 
a particular striking result, because primary voters are often thought of as 
 
 119 Id.    
 120 Id. at 13 (illustrating the ideological homogeneity of contributors based on an ideological scale 
ranging from liberal to conservative, where Democrat and Republican donors alike share 
ideological leanings more frequently than non-donors).  
 121 MAGLEBY ET AL., supra note 109, at 89–91.  
 122 Id. at 90.  
 123 Id. 
 124 Id.  
 125 Hill & Huber, supra note 117, at 14.   
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among the most ideologically extreme, committed, and activists among a 
party’s supporters.  The authors of the study claim it to be the “first analysis 
in the contemporary period to show that contributors hold more extreme 
views than primary election voters.”126  The figure below shows the ideology 
scores of donors, primary voters, general election voters, and other adults: 
Figure 3: Ideological Positions of Donors, Primary Voters, General  
Election Voters, and Everyone127 
As the figure shows, this pattern holds true for both parties, although it is 
more pronounced for Democrats than for Republicans.128  Specifically, 
Democratic contributors were “substantially more liberal” than Democratic 
primary voters, and the difference in liberal ideology between a Democratic 
contributor and a Democratic primary voter was about as large as the 
“liberal shift associated with being a college graduate rather than never 
having finished high school.”129  
 
 126 Id. at 5–6.  
 127 Id. at 13 (illustrating ideology scores of donors, primary voters, general election voters, and other 
adults based on a scale ranging from -1 to 1, indicating liberal to conservative ideology, 
respectively).  
 128 Id. at 13.  
 129 Id. at 14.  
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Professor Michael Barber is one of the leading researchers on ideology 
and individual donors.  His work reaches similar conclusions.  In a study of 
donors to state legislative candidates, Barber found that contributors were 
more ideological than “active partisans,” which Barber defined as “voters who 
identify with a political party and engage in political activities in addition to 
simply voting.”130  Barber was able to identify this pattern among both 
Republican and Democratic donors.131 
The proportion of donors who have a strong political ideology (defined 
as those who “self-identify as liberal/conservative, or extremely 
liberal/conservative”) also appears to be rising, starting with the aftermath 
of the 2000 election (and thus, partly in conjunction with the rise of 
polarization more generally).132  Thus, a study of all donors (both small and 
large donors and frequent and infrequent donors) from 1978–2008133 found 
that there had been “substantial ideological stability in the donor population 
over time until 2002 when the proportion of ideological donors sharply 
increases.”134  Starting then, and continuing into the 2004 and 2008 
elections, this work found “a unique surge in the proportion of ideological 
donors.”135  Specifically, only 42% of donors were classified as “ideological” 
 
 130 Michael J. Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of American Legislatures, 78 J. 
POL. 296, 306 (2015). 
 131 Id. (noting that among both Republicans and Democrats, “donors to state candidates are more 
ideologically extreme than those who are equally politically active yet do not contribute money”).  
 132 Raymond J. La Raja & David L. Wiltse, Don’t Blame Donors for Ideological Polarization of Political Parties:  
Ideological Change and Stability Among Political Contributors, 1972–2008, 40 AM. POL. RES. 501, 510 
(2012) (discussing the recent increase in ideological polarization in the United States).  
 133 Id. at 501.  
 134 Id.   
 135 Id. at 504.  
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in 1974, while 63% of donors were by 2008.136  The rise of ideologues in the 
donor pool is shown in the figure below:  
Figure 4: Increase Over Time in Percent of Ideological Donors137 
Finally, the most comprehensive study of both small and larger donors in 
presidential elections, based on a unique data set, has recently been published 
by David Magleby and his co-authors.138  For this work, the Obama, 
McCain, and Romney campaigns provided the researchers with information 
on small donors (under $200) that is not publicly available; the federal-
campaign finance laws require public disclosure of information only for those 
who contribute more than $200 in an election cycle.139  Although this data 
set is unique, it is limited to presidential candidates.  Given the much greater 
name recognition and visibility of these candidates, it is important to keep in 
mind the hazards of generalizing from contributions in presidential 
campaigns to other races. 
With that caveat noted, Magleby et al. found, consistent with other 
studies, that individual donors are self-described extreme partisans: 
We compared donors by treating the seven-point party identification 
question as a seven-point quantitative scale, ranging from 1 being “strong 
Democrat” to 7 being “strong Republican.”  On this scale, McCain donors’ 
mean score was 6.0 and 2008 Obama donors’ was 1.8.  In 2012, the mean 
 
 136 Id. at 510.  The number of ideologues in the donor pool held fairly constant until 2000, where 41% 
of donors were ideologues.  That number surged in 2002 to 59% of the donor pool.  Id. at 510–11. 
 137 Id. at 510.  
 138 See generally MAGLEBY ET AL., supra note 109.  
 139 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4)(i) (2019) (requiring reporting of contributions in excess of $200). 
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score of Romney donors was 6.1 while the mean score of Obama donors was 
1.7.  In all cases, over half of a president candidate’s donors were in the most 
extreme category.  For example, 53 percent of Romney donors identified as 
“strong Republicans.”140  
In general, they conclude, individual “donors differ from voters in being 
older, more affluent, better educated, more partisan, and more 
ideological.”141  Thus, study after study confirms that individual donors, as a 
group, are not representative of the general population and are more 
ideologically extreme than voters in general—even more extreme than 
primary election voters.142 
2.  Small Donors 
While individual donors as a collective are highly ideological, there is no 
clear scholarly consensus yet as to whether small donors are more ideologically 
extreme than other individual donors.  Anecdotal evidence, though, suggests 
this possibility.  As one scholar has put it, “[t]he most successful small-money 
fund-raisers mix media exposure with partisan taunting and ideological 
appeals.”143 
In the 2012 House elections, for example, the three biggest fundraisers 
were Speaker John Boehner ($22 million), who would be expected to top the 
list, given his position at the apex of power.  But he was quickly (and closely) 
followed by two of the more extreme members of the House, Rep. Allen West 
($19 million) and Rep. Michele Bachman ($15 million).  For comparison, the 
average victor in those House elections raised about $1.7 million and the 
Majority Leader of the House, Eric Cantor, was far behind West and 
Bachmann at $5 million.  Moreover, these candidates from the ideological 
poles are often much more dependent on small donations than other 
candidates.  Donors of less than $200 accounted for 64% of Bachmann’s 
contributions, 48% of West’s contributions, but 5% of Cantor’s total 
raised.144  In the 2010 elections, Bachmann herself raised more money from 
 
 140 MAGLEBY ET AL., supra note 109, at 55–56. 
 141 Id. at 64. 
 142 While many donors considered themselves to be strong partisans, less than 20% of donors were 
willing to describe themselves as “extreme liberals/conservatives.”  Seth J. Hill & Gregory A. 
Huber, Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate: Results from Merged Survey and 
Administrative Records, 39 POL. BEHAV. 3, 13 (2017).  
 143 Adam Bonica, Small Donors and Polarization, BOS. REV. (July 22, 2011), http://bostonreview.net/
bonica-small-donors-polarization.  
 144 Who’s Raised the Most, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topraise.php?cycle
=2012&view=topraise&display=S&type=A2 (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).  See also the underlying 
data from OpenSecrets.org summarized in Ezra Klein, Big Money Corrupts Washington.  Small Donors 
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small donors than was collectively raised by all forty-eight “Blue Dog” 
Democrats—moderates in the Democratic Party—running for re-election.145  
The more systematic studies conclude that small donors are no less 
ideologically extreme than large donors.  That is, to the extent individual 
donors are among the more polarizing sources of money in campaigns, small 
donors might well contribute to this phenomenon, rather than counter it.  A 
study by noted political scientist Raymond J. La Raja, for example, 
concluded that “small donors look almost indistinguishable from large 
donors in their policy preferences.”146  La Raja examined a 2012 survey of 
non-donors, small donors (those who gave less than $200 in an election 
cycle), and large donors, which questioned respondents on issues such as 
“abortion, wealth redistribution, taxes, and gun control.”147  The results 
showed that donors were clearly more ideological than non-donors, but that 
small donors and large donors were quite similar in their views: 
Figure 5: Policy Preferences of Non-Donors vs. Small and Large Donors148 
As La Raja stresses, “[s]mall donors are not, in the main, ordinary 
Americans.  They are sufficiently passionate about politics to part with their 
 
Polarize It., WASH. POST (May 10, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2013/05/10/big-money-corrupts-washington-small-donors-polarize-it/. 
 145 Bonica, supra note 143.  
 146 Raymond J. La Raja, Campaign Finance and Partisan Polarization in the United States Congress, 9 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 251 (2014).  
 147 Id. at 250–51.  
 148 Id. at 252.   
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money, much like consumers who spend on products they like.  And with 
passion comes extremism, at least relative to the rest of the American 
electorate.”149  La Raja & Schaffner continued this work in 2015 with the 
book, Campaign Finance and Political Polarization:  When Purists Prevail.150  In an 
examination of small and large donors to state-level elections, La Raja & 
Schaffner again concluded that “[s]mall donors are as ideological as large 
donors.”151  
One of the first large studies comparing the ideological views of small 
donors and large donors was conducted in 2006 by the Institute for Politics, 
Democracy & the Internet (IPDI) in collaboration with the Campaign 
Finance Institute (CFI).152  Beyond ideology, the IPDI Report provides the 
most comprehensive comparison of small and large donors across a number 
of different dimensions, including age, gender, income, occupation, religious 
faith, and education.153  However, there may be reasons to doubt how 
representative the sample was of all small donors given its methodology.  To 
study small donors, the authors compiled a list of donors who contributed 
less than $200 to a presidential candidate who had participated in the 
matching funds program, as these funds are required to be reported to the 
FEC, unlike most donations under $200.154  However, only six Democratic 
candidates and one independent candidate, Ralph Nader, participated in the 
matching funds program.155  While the authors were able to include some 
small donors to Republican candidate George Bush (taken from his website), 
the sample consists primarily of small Democratic donors.156  In addition, the 
sample relies on only one presidential election cycle (2004).  Finally, the 
 
 149 Id. at 251. 
 150 See generally LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80.  
 151 Id. at 114.  In a 2011 study, La Raja & Wiltse noted “that major donors (giving excess of US$200) 
appear somewhat more ideological than small donors,” though the difference was “slight” and was 
not explored in this study.  La Raja & Wiltse, supra note 132, at 519.  
 152 See generally INSTITUTE FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY & THE INTERNET, SMALL DONORS AND 
ONLINE GIVING:  A STUDY OF DONORS TO THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (2006), 
http://www.cfinst.org/president/pdf/IPDI_SmallDonors.pdf [hereinafter IPDI Report].  
 153 Id. at 12–15. 
 154 Id. at 7–8 (describing methodology for study of polarization among small donors). 
 155 Id. at 7.  
 156 Id. at 8 (noting that more information was available from the campaigns of Democratic candidates 
and Ralph Nader because they applied for matching funds and incurred a reporting requirement).  
John Kerry and Howard Dean did not participate in the matching funds program, so their donors 
are not directly included in the study.  However, the authors note that “39 percent of the small 
donors we surveyed [who contributed to one of the candidates who participated in the matching 
funds program] made a donation to Kerry.”  Id.  Therefore, Kerry donors are indirectly represented 
in the study. 
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Report defines small donors as those who donated a total of $100 or less, in 
contrast to the typical $200 cutoff.157 
With these caveats aside, the IPDI Report ultimately concluded that 
“small donors are no more extreme in their opinions than large 
donors . . . .”158  While not “extremists,”159 small donors did not necessarily 
have the same opinions as large donors, and sometimes expressed more 
conservative opinions than large donors:  
Large and small donors differed on two social issues.  Here we analyzed 
Bush and Kerry donors separately to control for partisanship.  Small donors 
were more likely than large donors to agree that “government should enact 
laws to restrict gay marriage” and “mandatory death penalty for murder 
should be the law.”  Small donors and large donors did not differ on the other 
economic and social issues of whether “government should provide health 
insurance for the uninsured” or whether “government should spend more 
money to reduce poverty.”  Bush donors and Kerry donors still are far apart 
on these issues, but within each group, small donors are more socially 
conservative than large donors on these issues.  
Among donors to John Kerry, small donors differed from large donors on 
the statement “taxes should be cut even if it means reducing public services.”  
Small donors to Kerry, while still tending to disagree with that statement, 
were nonetheless more conservative in their overall response. Here small 
donors appear to be more economically conservative on this issue.160  
The IPDI Report also found that “that small donors were generally more 
conservative than large donors when we asked them to place themselves on 
an ideological scale from ‘strong conservative’ to ‘strong liberal.’”161  
However, the IPDI Report ultimately concluded that small donors are not 
likely to be “polarizing,” in part because small donors to Bush and Kerry 
“are no more likely . . . to be party ideologues and place themselves at the 
end of the party spectrum.”162  The authors of the IPDI Report thus 
appeared to be using polarization to describe partisan political affiliation and 
not ideological beliefs.  
After its participation in the IPDI Report, the Campaign Finance 
Institute (“CFI”) continued its “Small Donor Project” and published its 
 
 157 Id. at 9.  The IPDI Report considered large donors to be those who donated $500 or more.  Id.   
 158 Id. at 1.   
 159 Id. at 43.   
 160 Id. at 35.   
 161 Id.   
 162 Id. at 35, 43.  
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preliminary findings.163  The Project surveyed donors and non-donors to 
state legislative and gubernatorial candidates in seven states:  Arizona, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Ohio, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania.164  The 
Project classified those who gave a total of $100 or less in a calendar year as 
small donors, those who gave between $100–500 as medium donors, and 
those who gave more than $500 as large donors.165  In 2008, Joe et al. used 
the data from this Small Donor Project to study the ideological differences 
between small and large donors.  Joe et al. found that “small donors . . . are 
not more ideologically charged than donors who give larger amounts”166 and 
that “in some instances” the policy views of small donors are closer to those 
of non-donors than to large donors, while in other areas, these views are 
similar between large and small donors.167 
For example, Joe et al. examined the policy preferences of small and large 
donors on two controversial issues: abortion and same-sex marriage.168  The 
results were mixed.  For abortion, Joe et al. found that “[t]he views of non-
donors are closer to those of small donors than to large donors.  Even when 
small donors take the strong pro-life position, their positions may be 
‘extreme,’ but they remain, in the aggregate, more representative than are 
those of the large donors.”169  The results on same-sex marriage were varied, 
with small donors in some states holding views in between non-donors and 
large donors.170  However, in Arizona, small donors “were more likely than 
non-donors or large donors” to strongly disagree that their state government 
should ban same-sex marriage.171  In other states, like Iowa, small donors 
were more likely than non-donors or large donors to strongly agree that the 
government should ban same-sex marriage.172 
 
 163 See generally Wesley Y. Joe et al., Do Small Donors Improve Representation? Some Answers from Recent 
Gubernatorial and State Legislative Elections, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (2008), http://www.cfinst.org/
pdf/books-reports/APSA_2008_SmallDonors.pdf. 
 164 Id. at 6 (describing sources of data for the study).   
 165 Id. at 7.   
 166 Id. at 2. 
 167 Id. at 16.  
 168 Id. at 10 (outlining the study’s approach to evaluating donors’ positions on “battlegrounds of the 
culture wars” (quotations omitted)).  
 169 Id.  
 170 Id.  
 171 Id. (describing a divide among small and large donors in Arizona voting on a 2006 state referendum 
on same sex marriage).  
 172 Id.   
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Joe et al. also tested to see if small donors held “unrepresentatively strong 
views about economic issues.”173  To do this, they “created a scale of 
economic ideological orientation by taking the average response to four 
questions about government intervention in the health insurance market, the 
minimum wage, tax cuts, and a tradeoff between environmental protection 
and jobs.”174  Joe et. al found that “small donors are slightly more 
conservative than non-donors” but that small donors’ “mean score is usually 
closer to that of the non-donors than to the large donors.”175  
Nor did small donors have different priorities for short-term government 
action on these issues.  Joe et al. found that “[a]cross a broad range of 
traditionally polarizing issues, the intensity of small donors’ preference for 
near-term state action usually falls between that of the non-donors and large 
donors.”176  Overall, Joe et al. concluded that they saw “few grounds for the 
concern that a greater influx of small donors will increase pressure on 
lawmakers to allocate more agenda space to issues that concern ideological 
activist minorities more than others.”177 
As some of the leading proponents of small-donor financing concluded a 
few years ago, it remains the case that there is not yet enough research in this 
area to reach  firm conclusions about whether significant differences in policy 
preferences and ideology exist between small and large donors.178  
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 178 See Michael J. Malbin, Small Donors:  Incentives, Economies of Scale, and Effects, 11 FORUM 385, 396 
(2013) (“[T]here has not yet been enough research to support either claim one over the null 
hypothesis that there is no systematic ideological difference between small and large donors.  The 
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not at the extremes in their policy positions, but between the non-donors and large donors (Joe et al. 
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C.  Relationship Between Candidates and Individual Donors 
1.  All Individual Donors 
More individuals are contributing to campaigns than ever before.179  For 
example, over three million individuals contributed in the 2016 election 
cycle, up from approximately sixty-six thousand individuals in 1982.180  In 
assessing the nature of individual contributions to congressional campaigns, 
it is important to recognize how high a percentage of these donations are 
now coming from outside the district at issue—indeed, from geographic 
areas far distant from those districts.  This is because out-of-district money 
tends to be from more extreme partisans than in-district contributions.181  A 
major study of out-of-district donations (above $200) notes that that in the 
“late 1970s” about 48–53% of candidates’ funds came from out of district, 
from 1996 to 2000 that percentage rose to 63%, and in 2002 and 2004 that 
percentage rose again to, respectively, 68% and 67%.182  For Senate races in 
2012, an average of 40% of individual donations came from out of state.183  
A majority of individual contributions came from in-district residents in 
fewer than 20% of congressional districts in 2004.184  And in nearly the same 
percentage of districts, outside money constituted 90% or more of the 
candidates’ individual contributions.185  Moreover, this money did not come 
mostly from those who live in adjacent districts, but from geographically 
distant areas concentrated in a relatively small number of districts, such as 
wealthy areas of New York, Los Angeles, Florida, Chicago, Maryland, New 
 
 179 Persily Report, supra note 64, at 22 (noting that “the number of donors contributing to candidate 
campaigns has increased steadily over the last decade”). 
 180 Id. (describing the recent rise in campaign donor numbers).  
 181 See James G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, The Check is in the Mail:  
Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373, 374, 377–78 (2008) (noting 
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of district); Brittany H. Bramlett, James G. Gimpel & Frances E. Lee, The Political Ecology of Opinion 
in Big-Donor Neighborhoods, 33 POL. BEHAV. 565, 572 (2011) (illustrating divergence in political 
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see also James G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee & Joshua Kaminski, The Political Geography of Campaign 
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Jersey, Atlanta, and others.186  Thus, 5% of congressional districts in this 
2004 analysis provided more than 25% of all non-local money, and just 20% 
of congressional districts provided a majority of the outside money.187  And 
“campaigns in districts represented by more ideologically extreme members 
secured additional nonlocal funding from individual contributors, even after 
accounting for the competitiveness of the contest.”188  Both cause and effect 
of the nationalization of elections in a polarized era, the much greater 
dependency of congressional campaigns on outside donors further 
contributes to polarization and the success of more extremist candidates.  
A number of studies to date suggest that “extreme” or ideological 
candidates receive more money from individuals than moderate candidates 
do.  For example, although “extreme” and “moderate” candidates may raise 
similar amounts of money in total, the source of those funds varies greatly.189  
In a study of donations to candidates for the House of Representatives from 
1984–2004, Johnson confirmed that “extreme candidates are more likely to 
rely on individual contributors than are moderate candidates.”190  To put 
this in concrete terms, across the ideological scale, “a shift in extremism from 
the congressional median to the third quartile” would translate into $67,000 
in additional funds raised from individuals.191  Johnson speculates that 
extremism might not be a fundraising advantage overall, however, because 
“any gains from being extreme are offset by losses among the ‘access-
oriented’ contributors, for whom extremists are distasteful.”192 
A 2009 study of individual contributions to House candidates found a 
similar pattern.193  Specifically, “the more conservative a Republican 
candidate is the more money he or she raises from individuals” and “the 
more liberal the Democratic candidate is relative to other Democratic 
 
 186 Id.; see also Bramlett, supra note 181, at 565–66. 
 187 James G. Gimpel et al., supra note 181, at 382. 
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 189 Bertram Johnson, Individual Contributions:  A Fundraising Advantage for the Ideologically Extreme?, 38 AM. 
POL. RES. 890, 894 (2010) (stating that while the number of “extreme contributors” is increasing, 
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 190 Id. at 890. 
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 193 Michael J. Ensley, Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology, 138 PUB. CHOICE 221, 230 
(2009) (investigating the relationship between individual donations and candidates’ ideological 
positions).  
 
February 2020] PARTICIPATION AND POLARIZATION 379 
candidates, the more money the candidate collects from individuals.”194  In 
actual fundraising numbers, while the average Republican in this study’s 
sample raised $144,000 from individuals, “total contributions from 
individuals for a candidate who is two standard deviations more conservative 
than the average Republican candidate would increase to $258,000.”195  
More recent data confirms these trends.  La Raja & Schaffner found in 
2015 that “[a]s incumbents vote in more ideologically extreme ways in the 
legislature, they tend to receive a higher proportion of their campaign funds 
from individuals . . . .”196  And Michael Barber’s important recent work 
shows that “legislators who are more ideologically extreme . . . raise more of 
their money from individual donors.”  Consistent with the discussion above, 
Barber also found that, “[o]n the other hand, moderate legislators . . . raise 
significantly more money from PAC contributions than do extremists.”197  
Barber presents these results in these two striking figures: 
Figure 6: Ideology of Individual Donors Compared to PAC Contributors198 
In the same piece, Barber showed that changes to contribution limits 
have significant effects on the ideology of legislators.  The direction of these 
changes is consistent with the general picture of how much more ideological 
 
 194 Id. at 227–30.  As an interesting and somewhat related matter, in 2017, Thomsen & Swers showed 
this effect is greater for women than for men.  Generally, “male Democratic and Republican donors 
are less likely to support strongly ideological candidates.  A one-unit increase in conservatism leads 
to a 32 percent increase in donations from male Democratic donors and a 40 percent decrease in 
donations from male Republican donors.”  Danielle M. Thomsen & Michele L. Swers, Which 
Women Can Run? Gender, Partisanship, and Candidate Donor Networks, 70 POL. RES. Q. 449, 458 (2017).  
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individual donors are than PAC donors.  Specifically, Barber showed that 
“raising contribution limits on individual donors polarizes legislators in 
office, while increasing PAC limits leads to greater moderation.”199  
Strikingly, Barber found that raising the individual contribution limit by 
100% (for example, from $1,000 to $2,000) had such a significant effect on 
legislator’s ideology that the effect “is equivalent in size to the ideological 
change we expect to see from a 16-point shift in a district’s average 
partisanship.”200  Thus, Barber concludes that state laws limiting individual 
contributions encourage moderation in candidates, who then become more 
dependent on PAC contributions, or, in the same vein, that state laws 
permitting high levels of PAC contributions favor more moderate 
candidates.201  Of course, one can be concerned that while PAC money 
favors moderates, it also might be more likely to be a source of inappropriate 
special-interest influence. 
2.  Small Donors 
Small donors appear to contribute more to ideologically extreme 
candidates than do other individual donors.  But some studies suggest this 
might be true only for extremists who are incumbents. 
In perhaps the most sophisticated effort so far to test this question, Bonica 
et al. compared “small donors” (defined as “donors giving $500 or less during 
a two-year election cycle”) to individual donors who are members/directors 
of Fortune 400/500 firms; individuals who are in the top .01% of Americans 
by income; and the thirty richest Americans.202  Bonica’s study shows that 
these smaller donors are primarily responsible for donations to ideological 
candidates when compared to much larger donors.203  The results show, as 
expected, that individual donors as a whole tend to give to more ideological 
candidates.204  But “contributions from small donors go disproportionately 
to candidates on the ideological extremes” compared to the other two 
groups.205  In addition, the top thirty richest Americans (who donate) are the 
 
 199 Id. at 297. 
 200 Id. at 303.  
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 202 Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 112–14 
(2013).   
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most moderate of all the groups.206  The results of the study are represented 
below: 
Figure 7: Ideological Distribution of Small Donors, Members/Directors of Fortune 
400/500 Firms, Individuals in the Top .01% by Income, and the  
Thirty Richest Americans207 
These results are consistent with observations that small donors tend to 
disproportionately fund extreme candidates like Michele Bachmann or Alan 
Grayson.  For example, Bonica has noted: 
during the 2010 election cycle, small donors (those who contribute $200 or 
less) gave $3.4 million to Grayson and a record-shattering $7.5 million to 
Bachmann.  Overall, ten percent of House candidates raised over fifty 
percent of small-donor dollars.  Moderates were less successful in attracting 
small donors.  In fact, Bachmann alone raised more from small donors than 
the combined amount raised by all 48 Blue Dog Democrats running for 
reelection.208 
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 207 Id. at 115. 
 208 Adam Bonica, Small Donors and Polarization, BOS. REV. (July 22, 2011), http://bostonreview.net/bon
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Other recent work suggests that small donors contribute particularly 
strongly to incumbents at the political poles of the spectrum.  A recent study 
of small donors to congressional candidates between 2006 and 2010 finds 
that, controlling for relevant variables, “[t]he most ideologically extreme 
incumbents raise US$306,557 more [from small donors] than their most 
moderate colleagues . . . .”209  In fact, the effect of an incumbent’s extremism 
on small-donor support is almost three times as great as the effect of the 
competitiveness of the election.210  Thus, Culberson et al. conclude that small 
donors are not as “benign as [one advocate] suggests,” but in fact may 
modestly contribute to the further ideological polarization of Congress.211 
Similarly, Johnson found that an incumbent’s “ideological extremism 
improves his or her changes of rising a greater proportion of funds from 
individual donors in general and small individual contributors in 
particular.”212  This work finds an even “closer relationship between 
contributions and extremism in recent years” for small donors who give 
below $200.213  This trend started to become more pronounced in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, which Johnson attributes to the growth of online 
fundraising technologies that were still in their early stages at the time of his 
work.214  
One of the leading advocates for small-donor funding has been the 
Campaign Finance Institute, under the direction of Michael Malbin.215  CFI 
has headed up a research project to study and promote the advantages of 
 
that the “ideology of recipient candidates is a weak predictor of contributor ideology.”  Id. at 22.  
In contrast, Bonica and Barber both believe their data bears out a consistent relationship between 
donations and ideology and that donations are a reliable measure of the contributor’s ideology.  
Adam Bonica, Are Donation-Based Measures of Ideology Valid Predictors of Individual Level Policy Preferences?, 
81 J. POL. 327 (2018), available at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086
/700722; Barber, supra note 104.   
 209 Tyler Culberson, Michael P. McDonald & Suzanne M. Robbins, Small Donors in Congressional 
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small donors in the campaign finance context.  In general, their research 
reports have emphasized the favorable democratic effects of small donors, 
including on raising the level of participation and the representativeness of 
donors.216  Malbin acknowledges the concern that small donors are 
polarizing,217 but he pushes back against it.  His arguments and evidence, 
however, are not strong enough, in my view, to overcome concerns that 
small-donor financing systems will contribute to the polarization of politics. 
First, although Malbin noted in an early 2007 report that one survey of 
donors to state elections suggested small donors had less-extreme policy 
preferences than large donors, he acknowledged this was but one survey and 
did not give it a lot of weight.218  Instead, his main structure of argument as 
a general matter is to note that the evidence does not yet show that small 
donors are more polarizing than other individual donors.219  Even if that turns 
out to be the case, it would not be a response, of course, to the larger concern 
that designing the campaign-finance system to depend so heavily on 
individual donors contributes to political polarization.  If all reform efforts 
are channeled toward small-donation financing, without considering other 
alternatives, such as public financing, that do not further entrench the 
polarizing role of money, small-donor advocates might send us down a path 
that further fuels the ideological poles of our current politics.   
Second, Malbin fends off some of the more anecdotal evidence invoked 
to suggest small donors are polarizing.  He is appropriately concerned about 
relying too heavily on stories which emphasize that, in the 2011–2012 cycle, 
for example, candidates from the ideological extremes, like Bachmann, 
Grayson, and Alan West were among the most successful small donor 
fundraisers.220  Instead, Malbin argued shortly after this election cycle that 
these kinds of candidates are “polarizing figures whose strident comments 
have gained them national recognition after appearances on cable television” 
 
 216 For example, they conclude small donations can act as a gateway to greater nonfinancial electoral 
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and thus they received many more donations as a result of air time.221  In 
other words, if the media did not give such ideological extreme candidates so 
much air time, they would not be so successful at small-donor fundraising.  
The relationship between cable and social media exposure and the ability to 
finance campaigns effectively was confirmed by Hillary Clinton’s 2016 
campaign manager, who has said:  “It used to be that money drove your 
ability to put out your message. . . . Now, it’s what you’re saying on cable 
and on social media that drives contributions.  The old model of using big 
resources to make your case to voters—that’s not really how it works 
anymore.”222   
But Malbin’s answer here is not a strong response to the concern that 
small-donor matching programs will enhance the weight of the ideological 
poles in both parties, particularly as compared to traditional forms of public 
financing:  the media has its own incentives that lead it to highlight such 
candidates, and as long as that is the case, such candidates will do better with 
small donors than more moderate candidates who do not get similar national 
exposure. 
Malbin also countered the anecdotal evidence from the 2011–2012 cycle 
with some additional anecdotal information of his own:  
When one considers all of the incumbents who raised $250,000 or more from 
small donors, almost exactly half had liberalism (or conservatism) scores 
above the median for all members of their own party and the other half fell 
below their full party’s midpoint.  That is, the top 5% of all incumbents in 
small-donor receipts (i.e., the 28 incumbents above $250,000) were 
randomly distributed within their own parties ideologically.  The parties may 
be polarized for many reasons, but these incumbents were no different in 
their policy positions from their large-donor-funded cohorts.223 
Malbin and the CFI, as advocates for small-donor financing, continue to 
resist the conclusion that small donors are polarizing sources of money.  But 
at best, the strongest form of their argument is that small donors are not 
obviously more polarizing than larger donors.  And none of their work comes 
to terms yet with the recent, more systematic and quantitative studies that 
indicate small donors are even more polarized than larger donors. 
 
 221 Malbin, supra note 178, at 396.  
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February 2020] PARTICIPATION AND POLARIZATION 385 
D.  The Motivations for Donating 
1.  All Individual Donors 
To assess whether individual donors in general and small donors in 
particular help fuel political polarization more than other sources of private 
money for campaigns, it is also helpful to examine work regarding the 
motivations with which different types of donors contribute to campaigns. 
For individual donors, a great deal of evidence supports the conclusion 
that ideological beliefs and issues are particularly central to the motivation 
for giving.  For presidential campaigns (2008 and 2012), Magleby et al. found 
that more donors identified the issue position of the candidates as a 
motivation for giving than any other single motivation.224  For example, 95% 
of Obama and McCain donors in 2008 said that the issue positions of the 
candidates were “very important to them.”225  And 96% of Obama and 
Romney donors said the same in 2012.226  
Bonica has studied in detail the motivations for those individual donors 
who give most frequently to a campaign.  For these donors, the ideology of a 
specific candidate is a greater motivation than other potential motivations, 
such as gaining access or seeking to maximize the overall electoral prospects 
of the donor’s preferred political party.227  This study focused on individual 
donors who had given twenty-five times (no matter the amount) between 
2004 and 2012.228  Bonica compared an “ideological model” of contributions  
to two competing models that had more of an instrumental or “strategic” 
dimension.229  The first of these strategic models is an access-based 
motivation account for giving, with “contributions as payments in a market 
for votes, legislative services, and access.”230  The second strategic model 
speculates that donors might be giving as part of an overall partisan electoral 
strategy; this approach “views donors as ideologically motivated but posits 
that they engage in electorally minded strategies which lead them to direct 
funds to candidates in marginal races in order to influence the partisan 
composition of Congress.”231  Bonica finds that the ideological model 
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consistently outperforms the access or partisan electoral models and that 
“ideological giving is pervasive among the most active individual donors.”232  
In the end, Bonica concludes that “ideology trumps strategy” for these 
frequent contributors.233  
In a 2016 study of a larger set of donors (and not just “repeat” or “active” 
individual donors), Barber confirmed that ideological agreement with the 
candidate is central to individual donors.234  Barber specifically studied large 
donors, using FEC data to study donors who donated more than $200 to 
Senators seeking re-election in 2012.235  Barber found that ideological 
agreement was “the most important consideration [for donors], with close to 
90 percent of respondents” indicating that ideological agreement with the 
recipient was either “extremely important” or “somewhat important” to 
them.236  Barber also found that “the ideology of the opposing candidate and 
the perceived ability to affect the election outcome are also an important 
consideration for many donors,” with nearly 80% of donors indicating both 
of these concerns were important to them.237  
Barber’s work on the importance of the opponent’s ideology to individual 
donors is consistent with previous findings from Pew Research Center.  In 
2014, Pew found that Republicans who “hold a very unfavorable opinion of 
the Democratic Party” are almost “twice as likely to have made a donation 
to a campaign or candidate” compared to Republicans who hold “mostly 
unfavorable” views.238  The same held true of Democrats—those with a 
 
 232 Id. at 374–75.  
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“very unfavorable opinion of the GOP are substantially more likely than 
those who feel only mostly unfavorably to have made a donation in the past 
two years (22% vs. 14%).”239  In 2017, Hill & Huber also confirmed this 
pattern, finding that the “act of contributing is more likely the greater the 
relative ideological distance the individual perceives between her most and 
least preferred party,” which Hill & Huber “interpret as evidence that the 
stakes of the outcome motivate donation behavior.”240 
Moreover, Barber also found a “previously undocumented pattern in 
donor motivations,” showing that “the most ideologically extreme donors are 
even more likely to be motivated by ideology when giving.”241  That is, 
ideologically extreme donors were more likely than moderate donors to say 
that the recipient’s ideology and the opponent’s ideology were important 
factors to them in deciding to donate.242  
In 2017, Barber sought to determine how donors chose to distribute funds 
among candidates.243  Essentially, he wanted to know whether donors are 
general “partisan boosters” or if they “instead sophisticatedly differentiate 
among members with respect to their policy records” when they donate.244  
Using a data set of approximately 2800 donors who gave $200 or more to a 
Senate candidate in 2012, Barber found that donors were not “merely 
partisan boosters,” but instead could “distinguish among incumbents on the 
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basis of roll-call records.”245  For example, Barber found that a “one standard 
deviation increase in policy agreement [between the donor and candidate], 
which corresponds to approximately three roll calls” would translate into a 
“52% increase in the probability of giving to that incumbent.”246  Issue 
agreement between the donor and candidate also increased the chances of 
donating for donors who belonged to the same party and same state as the 
incumbent candidate.247  Barber interpreted this to mean that “contributors 
are not giving to a senator simply because she represents the state and shares 
a partisan affiliation; instead, their likelihood of donating depends upon roll-
call behavior.”248  Importantly, Barber also found that individual donors 
were not more “likely to give to politicians who are committee chairs, who 
are on finance and appropriations committees, who are members of the 
majority party, or who are long-term incumbents with institutional 
power.”249  This suggests, as many other studies have found, that individual 
donors donate for ideological purposes, rather than for access-oriented 
purposes.  
Barber specifically acknowledged that his sample only tested those who 
gave more than $200.  However, Barber noted that he found similar results 
between donors, no matter how much they gave.  For example, Barber found 
“substantively similar results if we examine donors who gave no more than 
$200 to a senator versus larger amounts, or even between those who gave 
$200 and those who gave over $2,000.”250 
Barber also found that the ideological extremity of the donor did not have 
a consistent effect on a donor’s willingness to contribute to a candidate.  
While Barber found that “a donor’s ideological extremity reduces the 
likelihood of contributing to a given senator,” Barber also found that “among 
the same survey respondents, the probability of donating to President 
Obama is positively correlated with ideological extremity.”251  Barber 
speculated that ideological extremity may “influence[] Senate donations in 
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ways that are distinct from House or presidential contributions,” but did not 
pursue the topic further.252 
Finally, in a recent study, Heerwig compiled a new data set, consisting of 
“15 million individual FEC contribution records from 1980 through 2008 to 
identify the population of unique contributors.”253  She  identified “a sharp 
increase in partisan donor strategies since the early 1990s” and suggests that 
“relatively newer donors are more likely to exercise partisan strategies” and 
that some “existing donors have switched to partisan strategies.”254  Just as 
split-ticket voting has declined, so has “split contributing”:  for most of the 
1980s, about 17% of individual donors contributed to both parties, while in 
2008, only 7% did so.255  In possible tension with some of Bonica’s findings, 
she concluded that in earlier periods of her study, repeat individual 
contributors were “less ideologically extreme”; she found “a persistent 
positive association between frequency of giving and bipartisan or ‘split 
contributing,’” suggesting that ideology may be less important than strategy 
for some segments of the individual donor population.256  But the differences 
with Bonica’s findings might reflect the fact her study begins in 1980, while 
his begins in 2004, and as Heerwig notes, the motivations and patterns 
behind frequent individual donations appears to have shifted starting in the 
early 1990s.257 
2.  Small Donors 
Research specifically on the motivations of small donors is not nearly as 
developed as that for individual donors in general.  But the research that does 
exists suggest small donors might be even more strongly motivated by 
ideological considerations than larger donors. 
Joe and his co-authors, for example, found in one study that ideological 
motives are indeed more central to small donors than to large donors.258  In 
their study of small and large donors across seven states, they found that small 
donors are more likely to say that a “candidate’s liberalism or conservatism” 
is an important reason to donate than are medium donors, and that medium 
 
 252 Id. 
 253 Jennifer A. Heerwig, Money in the Middle:  Contribution Strategies Among Affluent Donors to Federal Elections, 
1980–2008, 123 AM. J. SOC. 1004, 1009 (2018).  
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donors in turn are more likely to say this than large donors.259  The same 
pattern existed for a “candidate’s views on social or moral issues” as a reason 
to donate—that factor is most important to small donors, then to medium 
donors, and lastly for large donors.260  Overall, large donors were more likely 
than small donors to cite material reasons for giving.261 
In a recent study of small donors in House elections from 2006–2010, 
Culberson et al. also found that small donors are not likely to give for material 
or access-oriented reasons.262  In line with other research, Culberson et. al 
confirm that small donors are highly purposive donors who donate for 
ideological reasons.263  But this work noted an interesting asymmetry, which 
further work will have to explore:  small donors only rewarded the extremism 
of incumbents.  That is, small donors apparently were not as motivated to 
reward extremism in challengers or in non-incumbent candidates.264  
Culberson et al. speculate this might mean that “candidates must first 
establish a record of their ideological extremism . . . through congressional 
votes” before small donors are willing to donate to reward extremism.265 
The IPDI Report discussed earlier, from the days before small donations 
grew dramatically, did not find dramatic differences in the motivations of 
large and small donors, but did find that small donors to Bush and Kerry 
were more likely than large donors to say that a candidate’s liberalism or 
conservatism motivated them to contribute (the effect was much larger for 
Bush donors).266  And small donors to Bush and Kerry were more likely than 
large donors to say that a candidate’s views on social and moral issues 
motivated them to contribute.267  Small donors to both candidates were also 
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 260 Id. 
 261 Id. at fig.4. 
 262 Tyler Culberson et al., Small Donors in Congressional Elections, 47 AM. POL. RES. 970, 985 (2019). 
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more likely to say that they believed their donations would be “a way to 
influence government policies.”268 
Finally, Rhodes, Schaffner & La Raja studied how donors choose to 
allocate their funds among candidates.269  This work was similar to Barber’s 
work on ideologically sophisticated donors, but Rhodes et al. were able to 
study donors who gave any amount, not just large donors.270  Rhodes et al. 
sorted donors into different categories of “donor classes” depending on 
donation strategy.  
These four donor classes included “Party-Oriented Donors, who 
contribute mostly to the political parties; Local-Oriented Donors, who 
donate to races in their own states; Idiosyncratic Donors, who tend to donate 
intermittently without a clear strategy; and Nationalized Donors, who are 
especially notable for their tendency to donate to House and Senate 
candidates outside their states.”271  Rhodes et al. expected that donors “who 
hold issue positions that are more extreme, who are more politically engaged, 
and who are more partisan will be more motivated to pursue highly strategic 
donation strategies that exhibit indications of discernment in the choice of 
recipients.”272  Thus, Rhodes et. al expected politically extreme donors to 
give to out-of-jurisdiction candidates and to be “less likely to give to parties 
because these organizations may often support candidates with whom they 
disagree.”273  While this study found this to be true of ideological large donors 
(they often gave out-of-jurisdiction to preferred candidates), they also found 
that donors with “more limited funds were more likely either to donate in an 
idiosyncratic manner, or to concentrate their contributions on a relatively 
 
 268 IPDI Report, supra note 152, at 27.  The Report also included qualitative information, based on 
personal interviews with some donors.  The following passage sheds some light on the motivations 
of those small donors who were interviewed: 
  [I]n our personal interviews we found donors whom we call “pragmatic donors,” and most 
of these were small donors to also-ran candidates.  These donors expressed pragmatic, 
even politically strategic, motives for making a donation.  They were politically savvy and 
knowledgeable of campaign strategies such as raising money to dissuade a potential 
opponent or to show a burst of popular support.  They liked the candidates they 
contributed money to, but did not necessarily expect or even want them to win.  Their 
donations were instead aimed at encouraging the democratic process or keeping an 
alternative viewpoint in the campaign.  They wanted a candidate they believed would lose 
to nonetheless stay in the race longer.  They wanted a candidate’s positions heard, even if 
they did not fully support those positions.  They gave money as a protest or out of a sense 
of duty.  These donors do not neatly fit in to the typical explanations we use to explain 
why people give money to a political candidate.   
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obvious target, the political parties.”274  These results do not necessarily 
contradict the other studies that find that small donors are more motivated 
by ideology in their decision to donate than large donors; the small donors’ 
“idiosyncratic” donations, for instance, could be directed towards highly 
ideological candidates.   
 IV.  LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS AND SMALL DONORS:  
VOUCHERS AND MATCHING PROGRAMS 
Much of the reform energy around small donors has been based on the 
actual experience with legislatively enacted small-donor-based systems 
already in place in a few local governments.  In my view, it is hazardous to 
generalize from these programs to how small-donor-based systems would 
work at elections for higher office, particularly for national offices.  Local-
government campaigns tend to be based less on broad ideological partisan 
differences, instead focusing on more pragmatic, local issues; moreover, they 
attract much less money from outside the jurisdiction than national elections, 
and such outside money tends to be all the more ideologically based and 
hence polarized.  Nonetheless, it is important to learn what we can from the 
small-donor programs already in place at the local level, in part because 
reformers rely heavily on such experiments.  
A.  Voucher Programs  
Voucher systems for election financing have long been a favorite of 
academic campaign-finance reformers.275  They are one type of reform that 
extolls the role of individual, small donors.  Essentially a particular form of 
publicly subsidized campaign financing, voucher systems involve 
governments distributing to eligible voters vouchers worth a certain dollar 
amount, which voters can then use to contribute as they see fit to campaigns.   
The theory behind such proposals is that they combine the anti-
corruption aspirations of small-donor-based financing with an egalitarian 
 
 274 Id. at 514.  
 275 The first such published proposal seems to have appeared in Edward B. Foley,  Equal-Dollars-Per-
Voter:  A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM L. REV. 1204 (1994).  Other prominent 
discussions of voucher programs can be found in the legal academic literature of Richard L. Hasen, 
Clipping Coupons for Democracy:  An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1996) and BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYERS, VOTING WITH DOLLARS:  A NEW 
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commitment by equalizing the capacity of all voters to make small donations 
in the amount of the vouchers.  Thus, when it comes time for academics who 
have spent years chronicling the problems with American democracy to offer 
fixes, figures like Benjamin Page and Martin Gilens seize on voucher 
programs; as they assert, democracy vouchers could “equalize the money-
based influence of every citizen, rather than just magnify the clout of small 
to medium-sized donors.”276  Indeed, the recently introduced voting-reform 
bill introduced in the House, H.R. 1, contemplates a possible nationwide 
voucher program, with pilot efforts to begin in several states.277 
But even though all voters are theoretically enabled by such systems to 
contribute, the question remains how many, and which, voters will in 
practice be motivated and informed enough to participate in these systems.  
As always, it is important not to be swept up in the democratic, romantic 
illusion that most citizens are as engaged by politics as the academics and 
reform activists who support these proposals.  As I have written before:  
“Participation has to be energized, organized, mobilized, and channeled in 
effective directions—all of which requires the very organizations, and the 
partisans, that ‘citizen’ participation is meant to bypass.”278   
In 2015, the first actual voucher system in the nation was adopted, by 
voter initiative, in Seattle.279  Ironically, in light of concerns reformers 
typically have about the role of money in politics, advocates for the “Honest 
Elections” system massively outspent their opponents, on the order of 30:1, 
with more than half the money coming from outside Seattle.280  Moreover, 
the average contribution to the campaign was $7134—a huge sum compared 
to the average contribution in the most expensive City Council race in the 
prior system, which was $166.281  Large amounts of outside money have thus 
helped make Seattle the first test case for voucher programs.  
As a result of this successful initiative, in 2017 Seattle distributed four $25 
vouchers to every Seattle resident eighteen years or older and eligible under 
 
 276 BENJAMIN I. PAGE & MARTIN GILENS, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA?  WHAT HAS GONE WRONG 
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124 YALE L.J. 804, 824 (2014). 
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local law to donate to a campaign.282  There was public disclosure of any 
voucher contributor’s name, the candidate to whom the voucher was 
assigned, and the date of contribution.283  This first election applied to 
candidates for City Council and City Attorney.  To participate in the 
program, candidates first had to demonstrate a threshold level of popular 
support by raising $10 donations from 400 Seattle residents.284  Candidates 
who chose to participate agreed to accept limits on their other contributions 
($250 per donor) and limits on their election spending.285  Voucher-funded 
candidates were released from these spending limits, however, if spending for 
their opponents—both spending by their campaign and independent 
spending on their behalf—exceeded the spending limits imposed on voucher-
funded candidates, a provision that raises constitutional questions.286  First 
 
 282 In Seattle, this includes lawful permanent resident aliens.  JENNIFER HEERWIG & BRIAN J. 
MCCABE,  U. WASH. CTR. FOR STUD. IN DEMOGRAPHY & ECOLOGY, EXPANDING 
PARTICIPATION IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS:  ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF SEATTLE’S 
DEMOCRACY VOUCHER PROGRAM 5 (2018), https://csde.washington.edu/wp-content/uploads
/2018/04/Seattle-Voucher-4.03.pdf [hereinafter Heerwig & McCabe Report]; CITY OF SEATTLE, 
DEMOCRACY VOUCHER PROGRAM, http://www.seattle.gov/democracyvoucher/i-am-a-seattle-
resident (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (clarifying that vouchers may be used by green card holders). 
 283 Program Evaluation, supra note 279, at 5–6.  For a study that attempts to explore whether these 
disclosure requirements chilled donations from certain potential donor groups—particularly those 
whose political views are at odds with the majority preferences of their neighbors, see Abby K. 
Wood et al., Mind the (Participation) Gap:  Vouchers, Voting, and Visibility, (U.C. Davis Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, No. 19-9, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3354826 (finding political outliers in their neighborhoods are no more or less likely to make 
use of vouchers than those whose ideology is closer to that of their neighbors). 
 284 Heerwig & McCabe Report, supra note 282, at 5. 
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 286 Id. at 6–7.  In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011), the 
Supreme Court invalidated the “trigger” provision in Arizona’s clean-money financing system, a 
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PEOPLE:  REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 103, 116 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy 
K. Kuhner eds., 2018). 
 
February 2020] PARTICIPATION AND POLARIZATION 395 
Amendment doctrine also prohibits candidates from being forced to 
participate in such systems, so any participation must be voluntary.287  
Candidate participation in the 2017 local races under Seattle’s voucher 
program was high.  Out of the fifteen candidates for the two city council seats 
at stake, twelve candidates sought to participate in the program (though only 
five managed to achieve enough threshold support to qualify).288  All four of 
the candidates who advanced to the general election for both seats 
participated.289  In the City Attorney’s race, the incumbent (and eventual 
winner) participated in the program, while the challenger did not.  In 2019, 
the democracy voucher program will be available for the remaining seven 
seats for Seattle’s City Council, and in 2021, the program will be available in 
the Seattle Mayor’s race.290 
1.  Which Voters Make Use of Vouchers?  
In the 2017 election—the only voucher-financed one on which data was 
available at the time this Article went to press—the voucher program did, as 
expected, increase the number of donors relative to the prior, purely private 
fundraising system.  A detailed, local post-election report on the effects of the 
voucher program found that over 20,000 Seattle residents used their 
vouchers to contribute to the eligible campaigns.291  This was double the 
number of cash contributors in the prior, 2015 election cycle.292  About 5000 
residents made cash donations to these same candidates.293  This report also 
found that “[n]early 9 out of 10 voucher users had never previously 
contributed to a candidate for local office in Seattle.”294  Yet before 
celebrating these numbers unequivocally, we need to keep them in 
 
  Counting independent expenditures in this way is problematic, as the Seattle experience illustrates.  
In the city attorney’s race, a non-voucher candidate tried to remain below the spending limit, so as 
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perspective:  only about 3.4% of people who were eligible to use vouchers 
did so, even though the time involved in using a voucher is no different than 
voting by mail, which is how people in Washington vote.295   
Similarly, while voucher users were also found to be somewhat more 
representative of Seattle’s population than cash donors, the differences were 
small.  And voucher users were still highly unrepresentative of voters overall.  
Compared to cash donors, for example, voucher users were more likely to be 
women, people of color, younger in age, less affluent,296 and local residents.297  
Thus, 27% of voucher users were “young people” (aged 18–35), compared 
to only 9% of cash donors, according to the organization Every Voice 
Center.298  Similarly, compared to the pool of cash donors, “[n]eighborhoods 
with household incomes below the city median saw a 42 percent 
improvement in the share of their giving among voucher donors.”299  
Yet even so, Jennifer Heerwig and Brian McCabe have shown that 
voucher users are still quite unrepresentative of Seattle as a whole.  Heerwig 
and McCabe are also the only researchers who have reported on the political 
makeup and political participation of voucher users.  Not surprisingly, the 
same variables that affect political participation in general also show up in 
participation in the voucher program.  Heerwig and McCabe found that, 
compared to the broader Seattle electorate, voucher users were more likely 
to be wealthy, white, older, and politically active.300  For example, “[o]lder 
residents in Seattle were three times more likely to participate than younger 
residents” and “[w]hites were almost twice as likely to return their vouchers 
as blacks.”301  Higher-income residents were also much more likely to return 
 
 295 Id. at 22; WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON VOTING BY MAIL, 
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/faq_vote_by_mail.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).  
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FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Every Voice Center Report].  
 297 In 2015, contributors to city council races who resided outside of Seattle made up 29% of the donor 
pool, compared to only 7% of donors in 2017.  Ron Fein, The Impact of Seattle’s Democracy Voucher 
Program on Candidates’ Ability to Rely on Constituents for Fundraising 2 (Free Speech for the People, Issue 
Report 2018-01, 2018), https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/FSFP-
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their vouchers.  Approximately “5 percent of individuals with an annual 
income above $75,000 participated in the Democracy Voucher program, but 
only about 2 percent of individuals with an annual income below $30,000 
participated in the program.”302  
The voucher program did not magically turn less-engaged citizens into 
active participants.  Overall, Heerwig and McCabe found that “individuals 
who were already politically engaged, as measured by previous voting 
behavior, were more likely to return their vouchers than registered voters 
who rarely voted in elections.”303  Specifically:  
Among registered voters who voted in every election for which they were 
registered, more than 8 percent returned their Democracy Vouchers.  On 
the other hand, among registered voters who voted in fewer than half of the 
elections for which they were eligible to vote, only about 1 percent 
participated in the Democracy Vouchers program.304   
Moreover, vouchers do not appear to dampen the level of independent 
spending in elections; in both 2015 and 2017, independent spending 
amounted to about 19% of total spending.305  
2.  Do Vouchers Fuel Polarization? 
As noted above, it is a mistake to generalize from local-government 
campaign-finance systems, including voucher programs, to how such 
programs would operate in national elections.  For Seattle’s first experiment 
with vouchers, not enough data yet exists for any systematic assessment of 
whether such programs differentially empower candidates from the 
ideological poles.  Voucher users were somewhat more liberal than the pool 
of Seattle’s registered voters.306  Overall, 95% of voucher users described 
themselves as “liberal,” compared to 88% of Seattle’s registered voters.307  
While 10% of Seattle’s registered voters described themselves as “moderate,” 
only 3% of voucher users described themselves in the same way.308 
An examination of one City Council race, however, might provide a bit 
of insight into the relationship between voucher donors and candidate 
ideology.  In one open-seat City Council election, both candidates who 
advanced to the general election, Teresa Mosqueda and Jon Grant, 
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participated in the voucher program and raised the maximum voucher 
amount of $300,000.309  Mosqueda, the eventual winner, was backed by 
labor unions and described as the “quintessential establishment candidate” 
by the Seattle Times.310  In addition to $300,000 from vouchers, Mosqueda 
raised approximately $158,000 in other in-kind contributions (primarily 
from unions and PACs).311  Vouchers thus accounted for approximately 65% 
of her fundraising haul, and she would have been a viable candidate even 
without the vouchers program.312 
Jon Grant, the other general election candidate, identified with the 
Socialist Alternative Party313 and was described as the “socialist-favorite” 
candidate.314  In addition to $300,000 from vouchers, Grant raised 
approximately $59,000 in other in-kind contributions.315  Vouchers thus 
accounted for approximately 84% of his fundraising haul.316  Grant, 
therefore, was almost entirely dependent on voucher money and would have 
been outspent approximately 3-1 without vouchers.  For other voucher-
funded races, seemingly moderate candidates were unable to raise close to 
the maximum of voucher dollars.317 
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Among reform groups, such as the Center for Popular Democracy,318 
Brennan Center for Justice,319 Every Voice Center,320 and Free Speech for 
People, Seattle’s first experiment with vouchers has been heralded as a great 
success.  Indeed, some voucher proponents assure us that “Democracy 
Vouchers are doable” and the “same idea could be applied to federal 
elections for Congress.”321  These claims, however, entail comparing the 
voucher system to the prior, privately financed system.  The comparison 
implicitly takes off the table more traditional forms of public financing.  It is 
a peculiarly American system of “public financing” to endorse such an 
individualistic mode of public financing, in which the flow of public funds is 
based entirely on how individuals decide to make use—if at all—of the public 
subsidies meant to empower them.  Moreover, little of the celebration of 
voucher programs addresses the issue of whether such programs are likely to 
further fuel political polarization.  The current flush of enthusiasm for small-
donor finance systems, including voucher programs, risks crowding out of 
reform and public discussion the more traditional forms of public financing 
used in most democracies.    
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Constituent Donors, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 1, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog
/voucher-funded-seattle-candidates-relied-more-constituents-non-constituent-donors-part-two.  
 320 See generally Every Voice Center Report, supra note 296.  
 321 BENJAMIN I. PAGE & MARTIN GILENS, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA? WHAT HAS GONE WRONG 
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 191–92 (2017).  To their credit, Page and Gilens are among 
the few proponents of vouchers who recognize the potential that systems of funding based on 
individual donors, including small donors, might exacerbate polarization; as they say, “public 
financing systems that shift power from business groups to individuals might exacerbate rather than 
reduce polarization.”  Id. at 219.  But not to be deterred, they then go on to say they see this as 
“another argument in favor of Democracy Vouchers, which shift money to all citizens equally, 
rather than to small private-money donors.”  Id.  But they offer no explanation as to why those 
politically active enough to make use of vouchers will not be just as polarized and polarizing as 
other small donors.  Implicitly, they seem to assume that once vouchers are available, they will be 
widely used, and that the forces of moderation will dominate over those of polarization.  This rests 
on the same view I have described above, that political participation through vouchers will 
immediately spring up and be widespread, rather than be subject to the same problems of 
mobilization, organization, and participation that shape every other mode of political participation. 
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B.  Matching Programs 
The forms of public financing that appear to have the most political 
support today, at least among Democrats and the usual cast of democratic-
reform organizations, are small-donor matching programs.322  Much of the 
enthusiasm and information about such programs is based on the experience 
of New York City, which first enacted this program, for local elections, in 
1988, and has had the most generous one in the nation since.  As noted 
briefly above, for citywide and city council races, New York City provides a 
6:1 dollar match for the first $175 of a contribution from a donor a candidate 
receives.323  Thus, the first $175 contribution is worth $1050 to the candidate 
(this multiple will now be going up to 8:1).324   
Reformers are now seeking to transport the New York City model to the 
state and national level.  In the Democrats’ first proposed piece of legislation 
since taking over the House in the 2018 elections, a part of the For the People 
Act, as it is called, would create a multiple-matching system, at a 6:1 ratio, 
for federal elections.325    
The few studies or reports assessing the New York City system,326 some 
produced by advocacy organizations,327 do suggest the system: tends to enjoy 
considerable participation from candidates; increases the number of overall 
contributors and small donors to campaigns; enables candidates who 
participate to rely more heavily on small donors than those who do not; turns 
fundraising into a form of voter outreach as well; and enables candidates to 
 
 322 See, e.g., Brookings Report, supra note 30, at 40. 
 323 Id. 
 324 A different kind of matching-funds proposal would seek to empower the political parties.  One 
version would do so by “allowing national party committees to make unlimited coordinated 
expenditures but to do so only from money the parties raise from small donors who give an aggregate 
amount of $200 or less.”  See id. at 49.   
 325 See Tim Lau & Daniel I. Weiner, Historic Bill to Strengthen Democracy Introduced in Congress, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/historic-bill-strengthen-
democracy-introduced-congress. 
 326 See generally Michael J. Malbin et Al., Small Donors, Big Democracy:  New York City’s Matching Funds as a 
Model for the Nation and States, 11 ELECTION L. J. 3 (2012). 
 327 ELIZABETH GENN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., DONOR DIVERSITY THROUGH PUBLIC 
MATCHING FUNDS (2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report
_DonorDiversity-public-matching-funds.PDF; ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST., SMALL DONOR MATCHING FUNDS:  THE NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE (2010), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Small-Donor-Matching-Fu
nds-NYC-Experience.pdf.  
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run who would not otherwise be competitive absent the matching funds 
(perhaps a mixed benefit, if those candidates are more extreme).328  
When it comes to the potential relationship between New York City’s 
small-donor matching programs and political polarization, though, I am not 
aware of any studies that directly engage this issue.  But any such study would 
be of little benefit anyway for national elections.  First, as noted earlier, local 
government elections are not typical of elections at higher levels; they tend 
to focus less on ideological differences and more on pragmatic questions of 
governance (after all, New York City, one of the most Democratic cities in 
national elections, has been governed by Republican mayors for nineteen of 
the last twenty-five years, if Michael Bloomberg is counted as a Republican, 
as he was when first elected).  Second, the New York City program matches 
only the small-dollar contributions of city residents.  Indeed, this feature is 
often touted as one of its most significant benefits, for it purportedly makes 
candidates more responsive to their constituents.  But in the proposed federal 
legislation, all small-dollar contributions from anywhere in the country to any 
House or Senate candidate would receive the 6:1 match in federal funds.  
Money that comes in from outside the jurisdiction is among the most 
ideologically driven money of all, of course.  A system that matches only local 
contributions will function very differently, with respect to polarization, than 
one that matches contributions from anywhere.  Thus, the New York City 
program does not, and most likely could not, tell us anything about whether 
small-donor-based financing will enhance polarization at the national 
level.329    
C.  What Happened to Traditional Public Financing?   
The aim of this article is not to compare small-donor public financing 
with the system of purely private financing that currently characterizes most 
American elections.  That small donors are even more ideologically 
polarizing forces in politics than larger donors is indeed possible, as the 
experience with direct-mail financing in the past suggests.  If that turns out 
to be the case, small-donor based “reforms” might well exacerbate the 
polarization of American politics.  But we do not yet have enough data to 
conclude whether small donors are even more polarizing than larger donors.  
 
 328 See Malbin et al., supra note 326, at 16–17; Genn et al., supra note 327, at 6; Migally & Liss, supra 
note 327, at 2, 10–11, 18. 
 329 For discussion of how certain small, statewide matching programs have worked (or not worked), see 
infra text accompanying note 346.  
402 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
   
 
We also, however, do not have significant data that suggests that small donors 
are less polarizing forces than individual donors in general. 
The comparison that matters for this Article is with traditional forms of 
public financing.  Only quite recently has small-donor-based public financing 
raced to the forefront of reform ideology, seemingly displacing consideration 
of other alternatives, including traditional public financing.  This Article’s 
concern is that in the current flush of enthusiasm for small-donor public 
financing, we might be ignoring alternatives that are not as likely to fuel 
political polarization.  
From the states, we have much more experience with traditional public 
financing than with small-donor-based public financing.  Currently five states 
provide full public-funding grants (AZ, CT, ME, NM, and VT) and three 
more provide partial grants.330  In traditional public financing—often called 
“clean money” or “clean elections” systems—the government provides 
qualifying candidates with grants designed to cover the cost of the campaign.  
Public financing must be voluntary, as a constitutional matter,331 and once a 
candidate opts in, the candidate typically accepts spending limits and 
foregoes raising additional private funds.  To qualify and show their viability, 
candidates must typically raise a small amount of money, usually in small 
amounts, that aggregate to enough dollars to surmount a certain minimal 
threshold.  As Professor Richard Briffault says, traditional “public funding 
probably comes closest in theory to the reform goals of equalizing influence 
in the financing of campaigns, reducing the burdens of fundraising, and 
freeing government decision-making from the influence of campaign 
donors.”332  With respect to polarization, since only a small amount of initial 
dollars must be raised from individual donors, it is not likely that more 
extreme candidates will be able to surmount that threshold than more-
moderate or centrist ones.  
So why has small-donor public financing seemingly pushed aside 
traditional public financing among reformers?  Three possibilities come to 
mind, the first two of which are political economy stories.  The perception 
 
 330 MICHAEL J. MALBIN, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., CITIZEN FUNDING FOR ELECTIONS 6 (2015), 
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_CitizenFundingforElections.pdf. 
 331 See, e.g., Daggett v. Comm. on Gov’t Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 467 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(upholding Maine’s “clean election” system). 
 332 Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: The Future of Public Financing, in DEMOCRACY 
BY THE PEOPLE:  REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 103, 108 (Eugene D. Mazo & 
Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018). 
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and reality might be that there is insufficient political support for traditional 
“public financing” of elections.  As compared to traditional forms of public 
financing, perhaps small-donor matching programs obscure the hand of 
public financing, and in so doing make these programs more politically 
feasible (even though matching programs are, of course, forms of public 
financing).  Second, the current celebration of small-donor financing might 
reflect herding behavior among the reform community and like-minded 
politicians; this has become the reform de jour, and one has to be concerned 
about reforms touted as the “salvation” of democracy that do not seriously 
engage with the potential downsides of such reforms, particularly their effect 
on polarization.333  That is always a worrisome sign of enthusiasm 
overwhelming analysis.  Third, there are genuine technical problems with 
traditional public financing.  The problem is how to design the grants so that 
they are neither too low nor too high (and adjust over time to remain neither 
too high nor too low).  If too low, candidates will not be electorally 
competitive, and they will not opt into the public-financing system.  If too 
high, too many fringe candidates will be able to receive public grants, which 
increases political fragmentation and might be thought to waste public 
money.   
To address this problem, states and local governments had added 
“trigger” provisions in the 1990s to their “clean elections” systems.334  Most 
commonly, the jurisdiction would provide the publicly-funded candidate 
with additional public grants, up to a new, higher level, if a privately-financed 
candidate spent above a certain level (in some places, the trigger also 
included independent spending on behalf of the privately-funded 
candidate).335  In some places, the spending limit to which the publicly-
funded candidate was subject would be raised, and the publicly-funded 
candidate authorized to raise additional funds.336  But in Arizona Free Enterprise 
 
 333 More cynically, Democrats are currently well ahead of Republicans in developing the infrastructure 
for small-donor fundraising, as the 2018 elections demonstrated, and thus it is no surprise that 
Democrats support small-donor matching programs—or that the Democrats who are most 
successful at small-donor fundraising, like Elizabeth Warren, are among the strongest supporters of 
such systems.  See, e.g., Getting Big Money Out of Politics, WARREN FOR PRESIDENT, 
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/campaign-finance-reform (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (calling 
for small donor matching).  
 334 See generally George LoBiondo, Pulling the Trigger on Public Campaign Finance:  The Contextual Approach to 
Analyzing Trigger Funds, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1743, 1746–50 (2011) (reviewing history of trigger 
provisions). 
 335 See generally id. 
 336 See generally id. 
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Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,337 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional 
the trigger provision in Arizona’s clean-election law, which provided if a 
privately-funded candidate spent more than the size of the public grant to 
publicly-funded candidates, the latter would receive additional grants equal 
to the amount of the private candidate’s spending—up to three times the size 
of the original grant.  Although the case did not address whether it would be 
constitutional simply to lift the spending limit for publicly-funded 
candidates—without providing the candidate with additional public funds—
if a privately-financed competitor spends more than the size of the public 
grant, Arizona Free Enterprise has been treated as if it eliminates all trigger 
formulas.338    
The elimination of trigger formulas makes getting the size of the public 
grant right far more difficult.  These technical problems undoubtedly are part 
of the reason matching programs have come to displace “clean elections” 
programs among many reform groups.  But small-donor matching programs 
will face their own technical challenges in implementation.  For one, they 
must decide whether the match gets capped at a certain total dollar amount 
or is unlimited—so that the more small-dollars a candidate raises, the more 
public funds he or she receives.  If unlimited, a 6:1 matching program would 
have provided an absurd $211 million in matching funds in 2018, for 
example, to Beto O’Rourke, who raised from small donors about 46% of his 
$80 million in contributions.339  But if there is a cap on the match, how is 
that dollar figure to be set, and how will it be adjusted to keep up with the 
changing costs of different campaigns in different states?  The currently 
proposed legislation in the House would cap the matching funds so that they 
do not “exceed 50% of the average of the 20 greatest amounts of 
disbursements made by the authorized committees of any winning candidate 
for the office of Representative in . . . the Congress during the most recent 
election cycle, rounded to the nearest $100,000.”340 
 
 337 564 U.S. 721, 728 (2011). 
 338 See, e.g., State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant, 732 S.E.2d 507, 517–18 (W. Va. 2012) (interpreting Arizona 
Free Enterprise to hold that “government matching funds triggered by privately financed candidates’ 
spending” are impermissible); State ex rel. Bruning v. Gale, 817 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Neb. 2012) 
(identifying trigger provision as principal constitutional problem under Arizona Free Enterprise). 
 339 Patrick Svitek, Beto O’Rourke Raised $80 Million Total for Ted Cruz Challenge, Left Little in Bank, TEX. 
TRIB. (Dec. 7, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/12/07/Beto-ORourke-80-
million-raised/; Texas Senate 2018 Race, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/races/
candidates?cycle=2018&id=TXS2 (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (noting that small donors contributed 
46.67% of O’Rourke’s funds). 
 340 For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 5111 (1st Sess. 2019). 
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Similarly, the match must be set at the “right” level and adjusted as 
necessary to ensure the purposes of the program continue to be met.  The 
current proposed national legislation uses a 6:1 matching formula, perhaps 
because New York City has used that formula for many years (though the 
New York City formula will now go up to 8:1).  Is this the right level for all 
national races?  To get a sense of how small-donor matching programs might 
function in high-stakes, competitive races that draw national attention, 
consider Florida’s recent 2018 gubernatorial election.  Florida matches 
contributions of $250 or less at a 1:1 ratio; candidates who accept this money 
agree to abide by fixed spending limitations.341  In the recent contest between 
Republican Ron DeSantis and Democrat Andrew Gillum, each received 
about $2.2–2.3 million in public matching funds.  Their direct campaigns 
abided by the spending limits.  Yet Super PACs spent nearly $41 million for 
DeSantis and around $36 million for Gillum.  More than $106 million was 
spent on the election overall.342  Even if Florida had applied the 6:1 matching 
formula, the public funds would have been a small percentage of either 
campaign’s financing.  If the point of the matching program is to free 
campaigns from dependence on larger donors and spenders, the matching 
dollars must reach a high-enough aggregate level to create such diminishing 
marginal utility for dollars of independent spending as to essentially make 
that spending irrelevant.   
This exposes a risk with any form of public financing in the United States:  
since independent spending cannot constitutionally be prohibited, the public 
financing might turn out to be a drop in the bucket and therefore not achieve 
much in the way of the reform’s objectives.  Public financing in European 
democracies is more often than not accompanied by extremely strict limits 
on outside spending, limits that would be blatantly unconstitutional under 
Buckley v. Valeo.343  
Before rushing to abandon traditional public financing in favor of 
matching programs, reformers need to confront the risk that the latter will 
further fuel political polarization.  Versions of public financing that include 
a trigger formula, such as one that simply releases candidates from spending 
limits, might well be constitutional. 
 
 341 FL. DEP’T OF STATE, 2018 PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCE HANDBOOK 5 (2018), 
https://www.dos.myflorida.com/media/698987/public-campaign-financing-2018.pdf. 
 342 See Danny McAuliffe, Millions:  Andrew Gillum and Ron DeSantis’ Money Race for Governor, FLAPOL 
(Nov. 3, 2018), http://floridapolitics.com/archives/280050-millions-gillum-desantis-governor. 
 343 See 424 U.S. 1, 143–44 (1976); Richard H. Pildes, Supranational Courts and the Law of Democracy:  The 
European Court of Human Rights, 9 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 154, 172–175 (2017) (discussing 
judicial review in domestic and international courts of European limits on outside election 
spending). 
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D.  Did the 2018 Elections Change Everything We Had Learned Up Until Then About 
Small Donors and Polarization?   
All the studies about small donors discussed above pre-date the 2018 
elections.  As noted above, these elections saw a staggering increase in the 
role of small donors in congressional elections.  The question is whether the 
experience of 2018 requires any significant revision in understanding the 
relationship between small donors and polarization. 
The most important answer at this stage is that, whatever a full analysis 
of the 2018 patterns demonstrates, it will be impossible for some number of 
election cycles to know whether these patterns reflect a “new normal” about 
the motivations, giving patterns, and beneficiaries of small donors.  Perhaps 
it will turn out that the 2018 midterms were so unique generalizing from 
them would prove to be a mistake.  Certainly, they were unique in the level 
of voter participation.  Turnout was higher than in any mid-term election 
since 1914, with about 50.1% of eligible voters going to the polls.344  This 
was a dramatic reversal of mid-term turnout levels in prior years; in 2014, 
turnout was 36.7%—the lowest in seventy-two years—and since 1974, 
turnout in mid-terms had averaged 39.4%.345   
In 2018, politics had come to seem existential to many voters:  the nature 
and future of American democracy was perceived to be at stake, for partisans 
on both sides.  Partisan control of the House of Representatives and possibly 
the Senate were perceived to be up for grabs.  With a President facing the 
lowest favorability ratings of any President through his first two years, 
Democratic voters perceived seizing control of the House as the only means 
of providing checks and balances on a President they viewed as threatening 
the basic institutions and norms of American democracy.   Not surprisingly, 
this extraordinary level of intensity in voter participation was also reflected 
on the dollars side of the election.  Not only was more than $5 billion spent, 
for the first time in midterm elections, but total spending leaped up 35% from 
the previous midterms in 2014 (for comparison, the increase from 2010 to 
 
 344 Harry Enten, An Insane Amount of People Turned out to Vote in the Midterm Elections, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 
10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/10/politics/record-turnout-midterm-elections/ind
ex.html; Emily Stewart, 2018’s Record-Setting Voter Turnout, in One Chart, VOX (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/19/18103110/2018-midterm-elections-turn
out. 
 345 Harry Enten, supra note 344. 
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2014 was only 5.7%).346  A significant portion of this huge increase reflected 
the dramatic rise in small donors, particularly on the Democratic side, made 
possible by the ActBlue website.   
Given the extraordinary context of 2018, drawing any general 
conclusions about small-donor contribution patterns would be hazardous, 
even once there is time to assess those patterns fully.  Many organizations 
sprang up to encourage Democratic small donors to donate strategically, 
rather than ideologically—that is, to give in a way that maximized the party’s 
prospects overall to win the House, rather than to give to candidates whose 
political views were closest ideologically to that of the donor.347  Thus, many 
moderate or centrist candidates benefitted significantly from small donations, 
including from out of state.  Still, as noted above, the candidates who received 
the highest proportion of their contributions from small donors in 2018, in 
both parties, appear to have been either from the ideological poles of their 
parties or, in one case, in a major leadership role in the House.348  But even 
with enough time to assess in depth the pattern of giving in 2018, it will still 
be unclear for several more election cycles whether 2018 was unique with 
respect to small donors or is a large enough transformation to require putting 
aside all we had learned about small donors and polarization up until now. 
CONCLUSION 
Political engagement in elections can take a  variety of forms, ranging 
from less intense, such as voting itself, to more active forms, such as: trying 
to persuade others to vote for one’s preferred candidates; displaying yard 
signs, bumper stickers, and the like; contributing money to campaigns; and 
actively working on campaigns, full- or part-time.  We also know that, in our 
era, the more engaged people are, the more polarized they are.349  
Political reforms based on seeking to increase more widespread, direct, 
unmediated citizen participation—including basing publicly-financed 
 
 346 These figures are all calculated from the data available on the OpenSecrets website, at Blue Wave of 
Money Propels 2018 Election to Record-Breaking $5.2 Billion in Spending, OPENSECRETS (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/10/2018-midterm-record-breaking-5-2-billion. 
 347 See generally id.; Carrie Levine & Chris Zubak-Skees, How ActBlue Is Trying to Turn Small Donations into a Blue 
Wave, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 25, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-actblue-
is-trying-to-turn-small-donations-into-a-blue-wave/. 
 348 See Richard H. Pildes, Small-Donor Based Campaign-Finance Reform and Political Polarization, 129 YALE 
L.J. FORUM, at app. A & B (2019) (providing figures on which candidates benefitted most from 
small-donor financing in 2018 House and Senate elections).  
 349 This is a central point of ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER:  ENGAGED 
CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2010). 
408 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
   
 
elections on the preferences of individual small donors—thus must confront 
the paradox of participation and polarization.  Merely making certain forms 
of participation available, such as by providing campaign vouchers or the 
ability to contribute small sums via today’s technology, does not mean that 
the vast majority of citizens or even voters will jump at the opportunity to 
participate.  There is every reason to think that, as participation in these new 
modes comes to be organized and mobilized, we will see the same patterns 
of polarization emerge.  Traditional forms of public financing, involving 
grants not so directly tied to the immediate preferences of small donors or 
voucher users, are likely to do less to empower the ideological extremes than 
these newer forms of public funding.   
American democracy has long envisioned itself as grounded in ideologies 
of “popular sovereignty” and the role of the individual, sovereign citizen that 
valorizes unmediated individual control of democracy far more than do most 
other major democracies.  Dating back to the Jacksonian era, we have 
exhibited greater distrust of elites, of intermediate organizations like political 
parties, and of the State than most other Western democracies.  Thus, with 
small-donor contributions exploding via the Internet and public financing 
more on the agenda today than it has been since perhaps the post-Watergate 
era, it is perhaps not surprising that the forms of public financing about which 
reformers in the states, part of Congress, and advocacy groups are most 
enthused about are ones grounded in the decisions of individual citizens, 
whether through programs that match small-donor contributions or through 
voucher programs.  It is hard to imagine European democracies even 
conceiving, let alone adopting, these forms of public financing (or indirect 
public financing). 
Small-donor-based public financing fits the individualistic culture of 
American democracy better than more traditional forms of direct public 
financing.  But from a structural and systemic perspective, there are reasons 
to be concerned that systems of financing grounded on individual donors—
whether private or semi-public—will contribute to the polarization of 
American politics.  That polarization, in turn, contributes to the 
dysfunctionality of American government.  While we extoll the virtues of 
participation, equality, and anti-corruption, we need to be wary about 
whether we are creating political “reforms” that contribute to some of the 
most disturbing tendencies of current American democracy. 
 
 
